An Atheism of Convenience: The Non-Rational Origins of Atheism

Sadly, it seems most people's denial of God is rooted in one or both of two things: Either God didn't do something the person wanted/expected, or He tells them not to do something they want to do. This means that most atheism has its roots in emotion and morality, which is to say not in logic. Few people "arrive" at atheism as a result of long, studied inquiry into the arguments of Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Aquinas, etc. They typically assent to atheism due to a much less sophisticated or rational source of denial, and so their faith in God is snuffed out prior to any real exercise of reason. This non-rational source of faithlessness, then, motivates much, if not most, atheism, and as such it deserves a closer inspection.

If you tell a person that there is a street in China, most people will likely believe you. Even if you’ve never seen a street in China, you will likely believe them when they tell you. Humans are wired to believe, for without belief people cannot function. Imagine if you had to literally prove everything to people, all the time. Prove the sandwich isn’t poisoned. Prove you’re my parent. Prove I’m from such and such a city. Prove that 17 is really 17 and not some other number. Prove my memory is accurate. Prove your memory is accurate. Prove that language has meaning. Prove that reasoning is rational. Prove you’ll never cheat. Prove that obeying the law matters. Prove that the law, and each law, is just. And on and on one could go. 

If proof is required of absolutely everything prior to its being believed or believable, then the first step of proof would be impossible, for the first step would have to be proven prior to the first step having been proven. As a result, nothing could justify believing anything either in general or at all, and one could not take a single step because believing one’s own senses would not be established. One couldn’t accept any explanation until they first proved that reasonable explanations ought to be persuasive, but it would be viciously circular to use reason to say that reason is reasonable. If reason cannot be trusted, then reasoning about anything could not be trusted, and so even the senses could not be trusted because one could not trust that one was reasoning accurately about the sense data. Even doubt would be impossible because there would be no rational basis for the doubt, for the very structure of doubt itself implies rationality, and so doubt cannot be so radical that it denies itself the rational ground on which it stands. That would be like using language to prove that words don't exist. The reasonableness of reason must therefore be presupposed on the basis of faith, on the faith-borne presupposition of the reasonableness of reason, otherwise reason must be disqualified, and with it all reasoning about sense perception. Faith is required, therefore, because non-faith is really just nonsense. This is why radical skepticism and nihilism are foolish, because in using reason they have already admitted belief in something other than nothing. 

In that light, it is clear enough that people believe things all the time, without requiring proof. This much is obvious. But why, then, would someone doubt something’s existence? If it is not born of extensive logical inquiry, then some other factor must be involved. Now, if the idea of God were utterly innocuous, then the risk of belief would be very low, and doubt would be less likely. For example, on the one hand, despite not having done the measurements, most people accept that the earth is so many thousands of miles around. If another person said that it was, give or take, several hundred miles different, no resistance would be given. No threat; nothing to doubt here. The truth is, though, on the other hand, with the idea of God comes all sorts of non-innocuous implications. These implications are sensed emotionally as either welcome or threatening to some cherished prior belief or commitment. Only if someone finds an idea threatening to their worldview will they find the motivation to start doubting.

Now, along with the idea of God comes the idea that one must both acknowledge and even obey certain restrictions. In short, God imposes on the free desiring of objects. Consequently, the motive of many people’s disbelief in God is, quite simply, that they want to do what they want to do. God is invisible, and yet the desire seems so tangible, and as such the disbelief in God serves a positive purpose in their mind to free their conscience to pursue the desired object or person. And yet, the absurdity of this being a rational ground for disbelief is obvious. It is merely desire counterposed to God, an atheism of convenience. In contemporary culture, however, convenience is king, and desire is nearly self-justifying, even virtuous, and so God is disbelieved at ever-increasing rates. Why believe in something that limits one’s freedom of desire? Today, the entire progress of humanity is being framed as the increased access to desires, coupled with the systematic deconstruction of all perceived limitations and restrictions, and so as convenience culture insinuates itself more and more, God will necessarily be made to seem less and less real and compelling. Since He does not give total permission in an environment where total permission is the intuited goal, belief in Him becomes consequently perceived as an existential threat to one’s very relationship with life; God is made to seem anti-virtuous.

Not only restrictions, others disbelieve God because He does not satisfy deeply felt desires. Rather than being upset by restrictions, they are willing to believe and obey as a transaction for the reception of desires and favors. As long as the sickness isn’t unto death, they will believe. As long as the marriage lasts, they will believe. As long as they get or don't lose the job, they will believe. And so on. At the point at which God finally seems uncooperative to the desire, not holding up His end of the bargain, their imagined and projected bargain, then the person begins to despise God for betraying their trust.

In order to deal with this atheism, one might be tempted to argue logically for why God’s existence is rational. But, unfortunately, this will not touch the motive of disbelief. The basic selfish motive is driving the show, and that motive is that what they want is king. For them, God either interposes Himself as an obstruction, or He fails to meet an expectation, and so either way He seems positively threatening. In either case man’s desire is made the standard, the criteria whether or not God ought to be believed in and obeyed. Without dethroning self, God will be resisted. To address this, then, one must address the man and his desires. One must address the moral question, whether desire ought to have limits. One must address the assumption that life ought to be as one wants. Until then, God will be resisted with existential fervor. Too much is at stake. The logical question of God's existence is simply an afterthought, a window dressing, a cleaner come in to wash and tidy up what is at root a matter of a desire for unrestrained desire and radical autonomy.

-Fr. Joshua

Appropriating Man's Curse: St. John of Damascus on Forensic Imputation

The matter of Penal Substitutionary Atonement is so often in dispute in these degenerate times by some, for their apparent shame at our Lord’s Cross, that it is necessary to defend this basic Biblical and Patristic truth against its calumniators. In order to show the Patristic mind on this issue, St. John of Damascus discusses the same concept under the term appropriation (οίκειώσεις). Regarding what is in Scriptural terms understood as logízomai or imputation, reckoning, accounting, etc., we will show that, utilizing different terms, St. John speaks of a mode or kind of appropriation (οίκειώσεις) that is understood as apparent (προσωπική) and in appearance (πρόσωπον), that is personal in a way that gives voice to the reality of imputation. He writes in Chapter 25 of Book 3 of his systematic theology on the Orthodox faith:

One should, moreover, know that there are two kinds of appropriation (οίκειώσεις), the one being natural (φυσική) and substantial (ούσιώδης) and the other being apparent (προσωπική) and relative (σχετικί). Now, the natural and substantial are that by which the Lord out of His love for man assumed both our nature and all that was natural to it, and in nature and in truth became man and experienced the things that are natural to man. It is apparent and relative, however, when one assumes the appearance (πρόσωπον) of another relatively (το έτέρου ύποδύεται πρόσωπον διά σχέσιν), as out of pity or love, and in this other’s stead speaks words in his behalf which in no way concern himself. It was by this last kind of appropriation that He appropriated our curse and dereliction and such things as are not according to nature, not because He was or had been such, but because He took on our appearance and was reckoned as one of us. And such is the sense of the words, “being made a curse for us” (Galatians 3:13).

At least two things become apparent in looking at this short chapter, that there are two distinct kinds of appropriation: one natural (φυσική) and substantial or essential (ούσιώδης), and one apparent (προσωπική) and relative (σχετικί). I referred to this conceptual distinction using different terms in a previous study where it was acknowledged that in Christ there is a distinction being made between the metaphysical (ούσιώδης) and the imputed (logízomai) dimensions of His economic appropriation. These two modes of appropriation highlight a distinction between who the Incarnate Christ is, in Himself, and how He relates in His Person (πρόσωπον) to sinners as their Personal (προσωπική) substitute.

On the one hand, in becoming man, Christ appropriated our nature and substance, becoming really and truly human. This can be understood as an ontological or metaphysical appropriation of human nature. On the other hand, in order to atone for sin Christ had to be “made a curse for us,” as St. John of Damascus quotes from St. Paul above. This kind of appropriation is not metaphysical, for otherwise Christ would actually become a sinner and sinful and so Himself need saving, which is absurd. The second kind of appropriation, then, is personally (προσωπική) representative or imputational, for “He took on our appearance (πρόσωπον) and was reckoned as one of us.”

This distinction is vital for understanding what is happening in the atonement, for Christ, being sinless, takes an additional step in order to savingly appropriate the curse. Of course, the Biblical idea of curse is a divinely legal term, as the same section of St. Paul’s teaching to the Galatians makes clear: “For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse; for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them’” (Galatians 3:10; quoting Deuteronomy 27:26). Therefore, as St. John Damascene alludes to this connection, “Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us, for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree’” (Galatians 3:13; quoting Deuteronomy 21:23). In this light it is clear that the tree of the Cross was the divine mechanism, so to speak, for Christ’s being made to carry the curse via appropriation (πρόσωπον) to His Person while remaining sinless. In other words, the curse was forensically imputed to Christ, which is to say personally and representationally appropriated by Christ, through the Cross.

Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that πρόσωπον is also a term that can be translated as person, or face. It can in this sense be said that Christ faces up to, personalizes, or appropriates sin to Himself via a relative (σχετικί), representational mode. This is the essence of imputation or reckoning (logízomai). He represents in His person the sinful man, according to St. John of Damascus, as “when one assumes the appearance (πρόσωπον) of another relatively, as out of pity or love, and in this other’s stead speaks words in his behalf which in no way concern himself.” Although Christ had no sin, He assumes the person or face (πρόσωπον) of the sinner on the Cross, carrying it as an imputed legal reality. It is forensic, not metaphysical, lest it be charged that Christ is Himself a transgressor rather than merely reckoned (logízomai) among them.

As Christ assumes the sinner’s legal position “as if” He were that sinner, that sinner’s status is forensically imputed to Him as the representative, and thus Christ is “made a curse for us,” as St. John of Damascus observes. In Himself, He discharges the consequence of sin so that His righteousness is imputed to the sinner, by faith, thus providing the needed righteousness and the needed life to the man of living faith who was previously dead in transgression and sin (Ephesians 2:1). St. John obviously calls to mind the legal representative, the one who stands legally in the place of the other. And although St. John does not explicitly reason according to Scripture’s legal terminology, the reality of a forensic imputation or reckoning of sin to the sinless Christ is being communicated by St. John, showing that his position is that of Penal Substitutionary Atonement and forensic imputation. According to St. John, it is in this way that Christ discharges sin in His very Person (πρόσωπον) by appropriating (οίκειώσεις) the divine consequence or curse (κατάρα) for human sin, which is death. 

The fact that it is not a metaphysical appropriation of sin but a representational or imputational mode (and in order to maintain this distinction between the metaphysical and the representational), it is entirely orthodox to understand this kind of appropriation (οίκειώσεις) as “forensic,” as the curse of the Law being applied to or appropriated by Christ to His Person (πρόσωπον) in a personal (προσωπική), relative (σχετικί), and not merely fictitious, way.

It is in the same section of Galatians that St. John refers to where the concept of imputation (logízomai) is explicitly mentioned: “just as Abraham ‘believed God, and it was accounted (logízomai) to him for righteousness’” (Galatians 3:6; quoting Genesis 15:6). It is not accidental that St. John, when explicating the doctrine of the distinct kinds of appropriation, should quote the same section in Galatians wherein the concept of imputation is laid down, for his concepts clearly overlap in significant ways, as we have demonstrated. This ought to show that, despite the fact that the Fathers may not extensively reason in terms of Scriptural legal language, the legal Scriptural concepts are well-founded and maintained by the Church Fathers.

St. John states:

The natural and substantial are that by which the Lord out of His love for man assumed both our nature and all that was natural to it, and in nature and in truth became man and experienced the things that are natural to man.

In other words, the metaphysical aspect of Christ’s Incarnation guaranteed that He was fully man. But clearly being fully man did not accomplish all that was necessary, for Christ moves onto another mode of appropriation:

It is apparent and relative, however, when one assumes the appearance of another relatively, as out of pity or love, and in this other’s stead speaks words in his behalf which in no way concern himself.

It is when the appropriation is relative and in appearance, although not to say fictitiously, which is “forensic.” Christ, out of love, stands in our place and speaks on our behalf, taking our punishment and interceding with the Father on our behalf. It “in no way concerns himself” insofar as He has no sin, but He stands in the place of the sinner, becoming the curse, for it  “was by this last kind of appropriation that He appropriated our curse and dereliction and such things as are not according to nature.” His atonement therefore had to appropriate something “not according to nature,” which is to say He had to have sin imputed to Him so that His death could function as an Atonement. It is forensic or “legal” because of the action’s intrinsic connection and reference to God’s law and the satisfaction of divine justice.

St. John makes a supporting argument in the paragraph that just precedes the chapter quoted above. The poignancy of the relative appropriation, which is to say forensic imputation, is magnified even more in that it highlights that moment on the Cross when Christ was “forsaken” by the Father. St. John says:

Others again are said in the manner of association and relation, as, My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me? and He hath made Him to be sin for us, Who knew no sin, and being made a curse for us; also, Then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him. For neither as God nor as man was He ever forsaken by the Father, nor did He become sin or a curse, nor did He require to be made subject to the Father. For as God He is equal to the Father and not opposed to Him nor subjected to Him; and as God, He was never at any time disobedient to His Begetter to make it necessary for Him to make Him subject. Appropriating, then, our person and ranking Himself with us, He used these words. For we are bound in the fetters of sin and the curse as faithless and disobedient, and therefore forsaken. (Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book 3, Ch. 24)

Notice the care with which St. John preserves the holiness of Christ’s metaphysical appropriation of our nature. In this way Christ was never forsaken, for “neither as God nor as man was He ever forsaken by the Father, nor did He become sin or a curse.” The forsakenness was “said in the manner of association and relation,” which is to say by “relative appropriation” or forensic imputation. St. John is thus not denying that Christ was forsaken in the relative sense, but in the absolute or metaphysical sense, and so the chapter quoted at the top is his method of describing how it is so that He is metaphysically consubstantial with the Father, absolutely holy and sinless, never abandoned as man, and yet “made a curse for us.”

That term "appropriation" is the Damascene’s equivalent of "forensic imputation." Forensic describes "how" it was "appropriated" really and truly but in distinction from being a metaphysical appropriation, for Christ also appropriated our nature metaphysically, i.e. He was truly man. Thus St. John states:

Appropriating, then, our person and ranking Himself with us, He used these words. For we are bound in the fetters of sin and the curse as faithless and disobedient, and therefore forsaken.

This is to say that Christ appropriated our nature metaphysically, and yet ranked Himself with us as sinners forensically, which is to say He had imputed to Him the “fetters of sin and the curse as faithless and disobedient.” This is therefore to deny that he was disobedient in His own Person, but that by relative appropriation or legal imputation He ranked, classed, counted, or reckoned Himself a sinner, “made a curse,”  according to the principle of logízomai. Christ took upon our forsakenness.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping

This series on Penal Substitutionary Atonement began here, and continued here, here, and here.

As If He Were Also a Captive: Forensic Imputation According to Scripture and St. Maximus

Insofar as the concept of imputation connects with the Biblical and Patristic concept of Penal Substitutionary Atonement, one point worth noting, regarding forensic imputation, is that it is not reducible to being portrayed as an invented 16th-17th Century concept. It is a Biblical concept, and it is a Patristic concept. Below we will demonstrate through both Scripture and St. Maximus that this is clearly Orthodox teaching.

Although a full analysis of the underlying Hebrew and Greek terms for imputation is impossible here, the primary terms in question are the Hebrew חָשַׁב châshab and, to a lesser extent, מָנָה mânâh, and the Greek term λογίζομαι logízomai, and also ἐλλογέω ellogéō.

châshab means “to think, plan, esteem, calculate, invent, make a judgment, imagine, count”

mânâh also means to “to count, reckon, number, assign, tell, appoint, prepare”

logízomai means “to reckon, count, compute, calculate, count over”

ellogéō means “to reckon in, set to one's account, lay to one's charge, impute”

*The LXX translates both châshab and mânâh as logizomai.

“So the Scripture was fulfilled which says, 'And He was numbered (logizomai) with the transgressors'” (Mark 15:28).

In other words, Christ was numbered (logizomai) with the transgressors. Transgression was imputed (logizomai), calculated, computed, or assigned to Him. And since this verse is quoting Isaiah 53:12, it is worth noting that the Hebrew term in use there is mânâh. Christ was reckoned, counted as among the transgressors. This is what imputation means, and since He had no sin, it therefore had to be imputed to Him. But a distinction must be made, for it is not a metaphysical imputation, which is to say Christ is not, in His own Person, any kind of transgressor, and so rather than metaphysical it is said to be a forensic or legal imputation, i.e. having a real character that is yet not metaphysical.

Chapter 4 of Romans, although not the only place, is the key chapter discussing the Scriptural concept of forensic imputation. St. Paul teaches: “For what does the Scripture say? ‘Abraham believed God, and it was accounted (logízomai, the Hebrew text being quoted is Genesis 15:6, and uses the term châshab) to him for righteousness’” (Romans 4:3). Abraham had done nothing yet, but on the basis of his faith righteousness was imputed to him, accounted to him.

St. Paul continues: “Now to him who works, the wages are not counted (logízomai) as grace but as debt. 5 But to him who does not work but believes on Him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is accounted (logízomai) for righteousness, 6 just as David also describes the blessedness of the man to whom God imputes (logízomai) righteousness apart from works: ... 8 Blessed is the man to whom the LORD shall not impute (logízomai) sin." 9 Does this blessedness then come upon the circumcised only, or upon the uncircumcised also? For we say that faith was accounted (logízomai) to Abraham for righteousness. 10 How then was it accounted (logízomai)? While he was circumcised, or uncircumcised? Not while circumcised, but while uncircumcised. 11 And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had while still uncircumcised, that he might be the father of all those who believe, though they are uncircumcised, that righteousness might be imputed (logízomai) to them also, ... 22 And therefore "it was accounted (logízomai, cf. Genesis 15:6 châshab) to him for righteousness." 23 Now it was not written for his sake alone that it was imputed (logízomai) to him, 24 but also for us. It shall be imputed (logízomai) to us who believe in Him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead” (Rom 4:3-6, 8-11, 22-24).

This concept of reckoning or imputation is at the center of Paul’s understanding of the Atonement as a core, non-periphery way of understanding what Christ has accomplished for us. In this way, despite the brief and indicative nature of the present treatment, it is clear that forensic imputation is derived from Scriptural categories of thought, both Old and New Testaments, and is unambiguously associated with the Atonement, for "It shall be imputed (logízomai) to us who believe in Him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead" (Rom 4:24).

The Scriptural case being outlined, St. Maximus also makes mystical reference to the concept of forensic imputation and Penal Substitutionary Atonement in Question 54 of his Ad Thalassios (Catholic University of America Press). He writes that Jesus:

did not become a captive together with us, neither was he dragged away into the captivity of the passions, 'for He committed no sin, neither was there any guile found in His mouth.' Instead, He was born among captives as if He were also a captive, and He was 'reckoned (logízomai) among transgressors' (Mark 15:28; Isaiah 53:12), 'assuming the likeness of the flesh of sin and concerning sin.' (54.14, pg 340)

St. Maximus is distinguishing between Christ’s essential or metaphysical sinlessness, on the one hand, and His taking on of the likeness of sin, on the other. He does this to show how an essentially sinless Person can be made to be “as if” a sinner.

Metaphysically, or ontologically, Christ cannot be a sinner, so the challenge is to show how He can be both sinless and the carrier of sin. In order to make this connection, St. Maximus is quoting a verse that centers on the very concept of forensic, non-metaphysical logízomai or imputation of sin. He does this not only as generally referring to it but also centering on the specific logízomai term, and thus shows the necessity for distinguishing a forensic, non-metaphysical imputation, because the divinely legal aspect insures that it is real, and not a fictional carrying of sin. Since Christ cannot metaphysically be a sinner or sinful, Maximus indicates that Christ had to undergo a process of logízomai or reckoning, which is to say imputation; sin has to be legally or forensically imputed to Christ.

Lest his discussion be less clear, he continues to unfold the logic of PSA:

He was in the ‘likeness of the flesh of sin,’ for whereas by nature He is impassible God, He deemed it worthy in His plan of salvation to become a naturally passible human being, without suffering any change in His divinity. And this was ‘concerning sin’ inasmuch as He was led to death on account of our sins, and 'for the sake of our sins He suffered, and on account (logízomai) of our sins He was wounded, and bruised on account of our iniquities, so that by His bruises we might be healed' (Isaiah 53:4-5). (ibid, 341)

Not only generally referring to the Scriptural section which is dealing with logízomai, St. Maximus, in a mode of Biblical exposition he calls "mystical contemplation" (ibid, pg 340), is honing in on and utilizing especially the logízomai concept, which is to say imputation, accounting, reckoning, or assigning of sin to Jesus who has no sin. Since it is not actual sin committed by Christ, the only way for sin to “adhere” to Him is imputationally. This concept of imputation, then, as indicated by St. Maximus in its mystical or "inner meaning," is the mechanism by which the sin of man was applied to, and thus atoned for by, Christ. Showing how in general he thinks mystically about the sacrifices, St. Maximus states elsewhere that "the law was not principally given to them [the Old Covenant Jews], but to us, in whom it was spiritually perfected according to Christ" (36.2, pg 215). Thus the reality of the Law and its legal sacrifices are not trivialized by Christ, nor dismissed by St. Maximus, but find their true spiritual meaning in Him for, as St. Maximus acknowledges, in Christ is revealed "the inner principle of the commandments" (ibid). Therefore "let us examine with piety the inner logic of those sacrifices" (ibid).

St. Maximus, although he is not focusing on the literal aspects of imputation and PSA, its "inner logic" obviously plays a key role that informs his mystical approach and analysis of Scripture, for he does not pit the spiritual against the literal cum historical but sees Christ as meaningfully addressing and fulfilling them both, the letter and the spirit (cf. 54.25, pg 347). In this way PSA as understood in a fuller Orthodox treatment moves beyond the more restricted Protestant treatments of the same, avoiding some of the grosser caricatures that emerge in the less responsible presentations of this mighty and subtle act of God. That principle being established, Question 42 also beautifully expresses this mystical perspective on Penal Substitutionary Atonement:

The condemnation of my freely chosen sin - I mean, of human nature's passible, corruptible, and mortal elements - was assumed by the Lord, who for my sake became "sin" in terms of passibility, corruption, and mortality, voluntarily by nature assuming my condemnation - though He is without condemnation in His free choice - so that He might condemn the sin of my free choice and nature as well as my condemnation, simultaneously expelling sin, passibility, corruption, and death from nature, bringing about a new mystery concerning me, who had fallen through disobedience: the dispensation of Him, who for my sake and out of His love for mankind, voluntarily appropriated my condemnation through His death, through which He granted that I be called back and restored to immortality. (ibid, 42.4, pg 243)

In St. Maximus' view, Christ’s Incarnate ontology did not complete the totality of the Atonement apart from the economy of the Cross, for without sin being imputed to Christ, that is "the corruption of nature" (42.3, pg 242), sin cannot be applied to Him so as to be atoned for "through His death" (ibid, 42.4, pg 243). Therefore, not only is the concept of forensic, non-metaphysical imputation a Biblical concept, but also a Patristic one, as St. Maximus demonstrates according to the mystical mode of his reasoning on the subject. The vicarious suffering of the just for the unjust hinges therefore on forensic imputation, and can in no way be styled a legal fiction, as the reality of the bloody sacrifice amply demonstrates. Penal Substitution is therefore a necessary aspect of any orthodox Orthodox understanding of the Atonement, including a mystical one.

By way of conclusion, the antipathy that some seem to have for legal categories is unfounded. God is a Lawgiver, and a Judge, and the Scriptures are filled with references to legal concepts. Using Scriptural legal concepts, and reasoning according to them, is not a capitulation to secular views of law, nor to an incipient legalism. It is not merely "Western." Although many have perhaps abused the doctrine of Penal Substitutionary Atonement, certainly the Orthodox are not beholden to the Protestant conception or presentation of it, much less to its grosser caricatures in some folk theologies. That being said, it is also true that the attack on this aspect of the Atonement is harmful; it is harmful both to the faithful and to purposes of evangelism. What is more, the acknowledging of the rightful place of PSA among the Atonement's other modes of description will serve to disabuse the Orthodox from those who falsely seek in Orthodoxy an escape from Biblical, and Patristic, categories of reasoning.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping
This series on Penal Substitutionary Atonement began here, continued here and here, and continues here.

Blaming Evil for Evil: The Biblical Case for the Existence of Evil

Many people, strangely, blame good for evil rather than blaming evil for evil. God, who is wholly and only good, is simultaneously both sovereign and not the author of evil, and yet evil occurs. How to explain this is what the present article tries to show from a squarely Biblical perspective.

From Genesis we read that God gave dominion of the earth to mankind (Genesis 1:28-30; 9:1-3). Yes, as the psalmist says, "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof" (Psalm 24:1), but as the Psalms also state, "The heavens are the Lord's; but the earth He has given to the children of men" (Psalm 115:16, cf. Jeremiah 27:5). Definitely everything is God's, and yet some of these things He put in the charge of another. In the case of the earth, it is man's responsibility.

On the other hand, mankind as a whole has presented himself to the wicked one as his slave: "Do you not know that to whom you present yourselves slaves to obey, you are that one's slaves whom you obey, whether of sin leading to death, or of obedience leading to righteousness?" (Romans 6:16; cf. 2 Corinthians 4:4, Ephesians 2:2, Revelation 12:9).

Even to the post-resurrection Church, St. John wrote, "The whole world lies under the sway of the wicked one" (1 John 5:19). Only those in Christ are set free. In other words, mankind, having given control of himself to the evil one, has as a consequence given his rightful dominion of the earth to the control of the evil one. Although the earth is given by God to man, through sin man has become an agent of the evil one and thereby bequeathed control of the earth to the evil one.

Now, regarding theodicy, since the earth is controlled practically by evil, what grounds remain for anyone wondering why evil is in the world? What grounds remain for questioning either God's goodness or His existence based on the presence of evil in the world? According to the Bible it appears that since the practical dominion of the earth is man's, then all evil is squarely the responsibility of man, and caused through man by his own sin and by his being submitted to the evil one.

Since evil has no existence in itself but is a corruption and misuse of the good, God cannot be blamed for evil but only blamed for the possibility of evil, which is to say people are critiquing God for creating free will. (If there is no free will then there is no critique.) In other words, God creates the possibility of both good and evil, and so revealing the mechanism of the world's evil shifts the argument regarding the responsibility for evil's existence: God who is good makes man good and therefore makes man responsible for man's own evil. Man creates it, so to speak, by the misuse of the gift of his freewill by submitting it to the evil one. Sadly, people would often rather blame the Good for the evil.

It is one thing to blame God for evil, and another to blame God for creating an environment in which one can freely depart from the good He creates and wills. God is therefore not to blame for evil, whether it be natural as in the case of tornadoes or certain diseases, or moral as in the case of theft or war, for the mediating agency that maintains the world's balance is, by design, man. Just as a small cog when damaged can ruin the right functioning of a large machine, so man's moral injury likewise sets the whole earth out of right balance. If man had full use of his natural and moral faculties, with no interference of the evil one, it is entirely possible that there would be neither disease nor destruction. Evil can therefore be blamed on evil.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping