Wednesday, January 22, 2020

God's Just Wrath: St. Gregory Palamas on Divine Justice

Living in the Fourteenth Century, St. Gregory Palamas clearly postdates the Great Schism. He was also a theologian and defender par excellence of the orthodox theology and practice of hesychasm. Moreover, he was an incredibly articulate and philosophically sophisticated writer, being in large part responsible for helping clarify the Essence-Energies distinction. One would think therefore that he was in a perfect position to reject vicarious satisfaction or penal substitution as regards the Atonement. A profound theologian and apologist, if there was someone who was in a position to be aware of the incompatibility between a juridical, substitutionary atonement and orthodox spirituality, it was St. Gregory Palamas.


In the collection of his homilies that have come down to us, St. Gregory’s Sixteenth Homily will be of especial interest. Its lengthy given title is: About the Dispensation According to the Flesh of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the Gifts of Grace Granted to Those Who Truly Believe in Him: Also Teaching that God was Able to Redeem Man from the Devil’s Tyranny in Many Different Ways But Rightly Preferred This Dispensation, Delivered on Holy Saturday


One of the first things a reader might notice as they study this homily is its magisterial character. St. Gregory seems to effortlessly touch upon numerous key doctrines related to God’s saving dispensation, seamlessly tying them all together in a masterful synthesis. From the multiple Biblical images of Christ’s atoning work, to the economy of His Incarnation, to the Nativity, to the Ascension, to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration and adoption, to God’s wrath and justice, and so on, Gregory shares with his audience a grand soteriological panorama, all the while supporting his arguments from Scripture. One wonders what audience heard such a homily! 


Turning to the subject at hand, that of Penal Substitutionary Atonement, it will be made clear that St. Gregory includes it as one of the essential perspectives undergirding the logic of the Atonement. And at least one thing can be gleaned from this fact of a multifaceted Atonement, with its array of Scriptural images, that no single model of the Atonement completely captures the reality of Christ and His Cross. The Cross of Christ is a Mystery that exceeds any exhaustive description. Not a weakness, however, this is part of its essential glory! More than merely a demonstration of versatility, then, and certainly not systematic, St. Gregory’s wide ranging exhortation is preserving and communicating a key insight about the Mystery of the Atonement, that its suprarational quality exceeds all partial explanations and yet binds them all together in a seamless and glorious whole. His homily thus stands as a testament against soteriological reductionism.


As vitally important and theologically necessary as the foregoing observation is, it would not escape soteriological reductionism if one were to then balk at the particular significance of each facet and therein fail to take account of their unique, precious qualities. The whole does not swallow the parts, but sets them in glorious relief. A symphony, the Atonement is neither a cacophony nor a solo. Each voice must be heard and understood in its own right and in relation to the others, and in relation to orthodox Christology. But in today’s day and age, what was once clear to the Fathers has now become muddled. Whole sections of the Atonement have been muted and escorted away by sophistical ushers. People caw and cavil at the juridical aspect of the Atonement, running away from any assertion of God’s unbending righteousness and just wrath against sinners. In seeking to make much of God’s mercy, they trample on His justice, not realizing that in doing so they have emptied His mercy of its holy glory. 


That being so, it must be pardoned that throughout the previous studies there has been such a consistent focus and emphasis being made regarding this particular facet of the Atonement. This is so not because it is the only or even the most important aspect, though it is certainly not the least, if such a judgment can even be made about any facet of such a wondrous subject; this is so because of the profound degradation it is being subjected to. We cannot lose what the Scriptures teach and the Fathers have handed down, and so it is with fear and trembling, and great respect for God’s Word and the Church Fathers, that we seek to remove the veil that has been so unjustly cast over this aspect of the Atonement. May God grant light for the unfolding of St. Gregory’s teaching on the glory of the Atonement.


At the beginning of Homily Sixteen, after declaring God’s sovereign freedom as regards any absolute need for the Word of God to Incarnate in order to save man, St. Gregory asserts that God’s “method of deliverance… had justice on its side, and God does not act without justice” (About the Dispensation, 115). Notice the inclusion of justice as being essential to God’s saving activity, and moreover that this “method was most in keeping with our nature and weakness” (ibid, 115). What, then, was the situation to which our nature and weakness had brought us? Gregory answers: “Man was justly abandoned by God in the beginning as he had first abandoned God” (ibid, 115). Man voluntarily made himself a servant of the Evil One, and thus, yet according to “the good Lord’s consent, death came into the world” (ibid, 115-16). Man’s abandonment was just, for God does nothing without justice, and even the entering in of death was according to God’s sovereign, which is to say His ruling, will.


Man’s nature, St. Gregory continues, is “defiled by transgression” (ibid, 117). He calls it “the original condemnation” (ibid, 117). As such, we are “born and living in passions” (ibid, 121), and death is “passed down by heredity” (ibid, 122). In fact, we “were by nature separated” from God (ibid, 123). Incurring God’s displeasure, “man was led into his captivity when he experienced God’s wrath, this wrath being the good God’s just abandonment of man” (ibid, 124). Having lost his connection with God, Adam’s condemnation was not restricted to himself as if it were a private and isolated event, for “our human nature was stripped of this divine illumination and radiance as a result of the ugly transgression” (ibid, 132). 


Reflecting on the statements above, the fact becomes obvious that man’s condemnation has an inescapably juridical element to it. Not only does St. Gregory assert the general principle that God does absolutely everything with justice, he also asserts that specifically that Adam’s condemnation was just, for Adam transgressed God’s command. And not only Adam, but all of human nature is justly condemned. God’s very wrath is now man’s hereditary inheritance from Adam, mankind as a whole being justly abandoned by God. This question of the “wrath of God” Gregory explains as “God’s just abandonment of man” (ibid, 124). Therefore, as he says elsewhere and in reference to John’s Gospel (3:35-36), “those who did not believe he threatened with God’s inescapable wrath,” because for he who does not believe, “the wrath of God abideth on him” (ibid, 121). In fact, “we had been vessels of wrath” (ibid, 129; cf. Romans 9:22-23). The wrath of God is therefore a present (eschatological) reality in which fallen man is currently existing, and thus it is not only a future condemnation. Gregory’s understanding is that man is born a child of wrath (cf. Ephesians 2:3), for “we were children of wrath, as God had justly abandoned us because of our sin and disobedience” (ibid, 122). We “were by nature separate” (ibid, 123). Thus wrath is both a juridical category and a state of being, that of separation, although not a metaphysical separation for that would entail non-existence. As such, man is legally condemned to death according to the hereditary condition of his fallen human nature and his willful transgression.


The just consequence of man’s abandonment results, finally, in man’s death. But is death, according to St. Gregory, merely a question of receiving a limited lifespan? It could seem this way from the opening statement of the homily when he says that Christ “saved man from mortality” (ibid, 115). But in Gregory’s teaching throughout this homily, man’s mortality is expressly twofold, for “because of the devil’s overwhelming evil, death became twofold” (ibid, 116, cf. 118). Man’s mortality is thus twofold, both physical and spiritual, and Christ healed this twofold death, as Gregory states: “He healed our twofold death and freed us from our double captivity of soul and body” (ibid, 126). Christ therefore did not address only the problem of the human lifespan, but his more fundamental problem of spiritual death, which is to say separation from God, also. Since, “of necessity bodily death followed this spiritual death, so the evil one caused our double death” (ibid, 126). Christ’s relation to man, therefore, as his Savior, included addressing this double problem of man’s just condemnation: “death both of the soul and of the body, temporary and eternal” (ibid, 128).

St. Gregory sees that man’s problem is not simply physical death. It is not simply that man is born alive and then one day dies; man is not mortal in this conventional sense. For bodily death follows spiritual death; it does not precede spiritual death. Man is born thus with this fallen human nature that is justly condemned and separated from God, which is to say spiritually dead. In other words, man is according to his fallen nature born spiritually dead (cf. Ephesians 2:1-3) and in a state of separation from God. As a servant of the devil (ibid, 115), mankind is now made “to share his [the devil's] own sin and spiritual deadness” (ibid, 126). Man is, essentially, born in communion with the devil. St. Gregory states that even “after death our souls [have] been deserted by God” (ibid, 126).
It is shocking to behold the darkness into which the light of Christ shines. It is pleasant to discuss the light. The reality of man’s being separated from God, however, is difficult to fathom, and intrinsically inspires aversion (whether to the reality or to the mere suggestion of it), and beyond this the notion of an eternal hell can seem grossly disproportionate. Although the question of the proportionality of an eternal hell was dealt with in a previous study, and the absolute condemnation of universalism in another, it is also worth noting that St. Gregory affirms an eternal hell. After a faithless man sinks from bad to worse: “Eventually, after the wretched soul has lived apart from the body without repenting, it will be handed over, together with the body, to the endless, unbearable bondage of eternal damnation which God has prepared for the devil and his angels” (ibid, 119; cf. 128; Matthew 25:41). This is the second death following the Final Judgment (cf. Revelation 20:7-15). This horror is why Gregory can say: “Except for sin nothing in this life, even death itself, is really evil, even if it causes suffering” (16.33, pg 130).


On this subject, one further way to understand how it is that hell is eternal is because God will not ultimately destroy anything He created good, even if it perverted itself, which is to say He will not annihilate anything that has being or existence. Impious men and demons are therefore not annihilated, contra annihilationism, and the reason includes the simple fact that God created them. He won’t absolutely annihilate that which has at least that measure of goodness, that bare fact of having existence. They are preserved therefore in their being for this reason. But, because of their evil turn of free will, they persist in everlasting hell without so much as an iota of injustice.


Moving forward, Christ addressed our twofold death problem. Since human nature itself was justly condemned, “the incarnation of the Word of God was the method of deliverance most in keeping with our nature and weakness, and most appropriate for Him who carried it out, for this method had justice on its side, and God does not act without justice” (ibid, 115). Not an act independent of His justice, even less done in isolation from His justice, in St. Gregory’s mind, the justice of God was integral to the Incarnation. It is in this light that St. Gregory speaks of God’s just abandonment of man, and so it is necessary that man be justly restored, for “man had been surrendered to the envious devil by divine righteousness” (ibid, 116). Therefore, Gregory argues, “it was clearly necessary that the human race’s return to freedom and life should be accomplished by God in a just way” (ibid, 116). In other words, there is a definite juridical element to the Atonement. Since man’s nature was conquered by the devil, Gregory considered it “also necessary for the conqueror [the devil] to be conquered by that nature [via the Incarnation] which he [the devil] had conquered [man’s]” (ibid, 116). Man’s sin gave the devil legal right over him. For this reason and “to this end it was necessary and indispensable that a man be made who was sinless” (ibid, 116). Sinlessness, in short, was required as a condition of justice.


The question now is, how does St. Gregory present the manner salvation? Or more narrowly, how is human nature justified? To answer this, Gregory presents at least two foci, one incarnational and one sacrificial. Under the heading of the Incarnation there are two aspects. There is, first of all, the ontological fact of his taking on human nature and, second, the ministerial activity centering on Christ’s teaching and healing ministry among men. He states of the ontological aspect: “God took human nature upon Himself to show that it was so far removed from sin and so cleansed that it could be united with His person and remain eternally undivided from Him” (ibid, pg 119). That Gregory has in mind a connection between our Fall, His Incarnation (ontology and ministry inclusive), and our justification, he states also with an eye to the ministerial activity that, “when we had cast ourselves down and fallen away from this vision [i.e. our original blessed condition among God and His angels], God came down to us from on high in His surpassing love for mankind, without in any way giving up His divinity, and be living among us set Himself before us as the pattern of the way back to life” (ibid, 119). Here the salvific nature of the ontological aspect of the Incarnation is woven together with what is sometimes termed moral exemplarism. Thus, through both His life and ministry, “human nature was justified, as not being evil in itself, but God was justified as well, as not in any way being the cause and maker of evil” (ibid, 119). In this way the notion of justification is woven into the Incarnation, which is to include both Christ’s life and ministry. This aspect of justification is addressed especially to the righting of our human nature, and to revealing God’s goodness and justice thereby, for “by this act He proclaimed to all that God is both good and just, the Maker of good things who upholds fair judgment” (ibid, 119-20).


The second foci of St. Gregory’s presentation of the Atonement is that of sacrifice. This immediately calls to mind the Old Testament sacrifices which serve to inform the very concept of sacrifice. Thus St. Gregory speaks of the Lord, in the context of His meeting with St. John the Forerunner, as “the Lamb of God who was taking away the sin of the world, thus proclaiming in advance His sacrifice and slaughter for our sins” (16.14, pg 121). This immediately brings into the Atonement a dimension beyond the stage of the appropriation of human nature, and beyond His being “our teacher, using words” (16.10, pg 119), but one that is cultic and therefore juridical. St. Gregory thus speaks of the Lord’s “plan for our salvation” (16.20, pg 123) as not only Christ's atoning for man in terms of His having a human nature and being a moral exemplar leading the way, but also as incorporating a necessary juridical dimension of the Atonement which includes that God has to be propitiated, for “God had to be reconciled with the human race” (16.20, pg 124). In order to accomplish this, “a sacrifice was needed to reconcile the Father on high with us and to sanctify us” (16.21, pg 124). Notice especially the directionality, that the Father is being reconciled by the Incarnate Son. In other words, although it is the foundation for the sacrifice, man's problem is not solved only at the level of Christ's appropriation of our metaphysical status as a human being, for “there had to be a sacrifice which both cleansed and was clean, and a purified, sinless priest” (16.21, pg 124). And so Christ, as the High Priest, was Himself that sacrifice, calling to mind the legal, cultic sacrificial system. As St. Gregory concludes this paragraph, he again highlights the greatness of the “plan of salvation,” and stresses again that “all these things were done with justice, without which God does not act” (16.21, pg 124), the devil even being “justly deceived” (16.22, pg 124). An additional reason he gives is that “the devil would not have ceased from boasting if he had been subdued by God’s sovereign power and not pulled down from his authority by justice and wisdom” (16.22, pg 124). The juridical element, then, is necessary to abolish any hold that the devil may seek to boastfully maintain on legal grounds.


Generally, if a notion of God’s justice is essential to the Atonement, then necessarily this means there is a juridical aspect, for this is simply to say the same thing in a different way. It is also no different to affirm that it is forensic and legal. These are only different ways of saying the same thing, different words conveying the same basic concept. Moreover, the Law of God is not only legal, it is also cultic, which is to say the sacrifices themselves have a juridical, forensic, or legal aspect to them. The very notion of atonement is legal and cultic. It is thus passing strange when people deny the juridical element of the Atonement. It is clear that, due to their interconceptuality, to affirm that Christ’s death is related to justice, to a sacrifice, or that it is in any way atoning, it is and must be forensic. To deny this would be Neo-Marcionism. 

Of course, the Atonement is more than a matter of law, but it is not less than a matter of law, either. Those who seek to reduce the Atonement to personal or cosmic ontology (e.g. theosis) and moral influence are succumbing to Neo-Marcionism, denying the very Law which, to the smallest details, Christ intentionally fulfilled: “For assuredly, I say to you, till heaven and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle will by no means pass from the law till all is fulfilled” (Matthew 5:18). Theosis is essential to the Atonement, certainly, but this cannot be made to undercut Christ’s Personal attentiveness to the Law, which is to say His own attentiveness to His own legal covenant and to His own Scriptural word understood more broadly to include the entire Old Covenant canon. This element of Christ’s work cannot be ignored, much less surrendered. “Beginning at Moses and all the Prophets,” Christ’s life was framed by the Gospels and Epistles as a fulfilling of the Scriptures. This is the reason for the New Testament refrain, “the Scripture was fulfilled...’” (Mark 15:28; cf. Luke 4:21; John 13:18, 17:12, 19:24, 28, 36; Acts 1:16; James 2:23). If God Himself is so attentive and careful to fulfill His own word, and this word is inescapably legal and so covenantal, then to deny the juridical elements of the Atonement is not only to deny the faithfulness of God in keeping His own word, it is to deny the Atonement. This Neo-Marcionism leaves everyone still in their sins. It is a different Gospel.
Returning to St. Gregory’s exposition of the Atonement, it is clear that the Incarnation and active obedience of Christ in themselves were not intended to accomplish the totality of man’s sanctification, and so a holy sacrifice was yet needed to complete the process: “Sanctification is accomplished by each person’s offering and sacrifice of firstfruits, but as the firstfruits have to be pure, we are not able to offer such a sacrifice to God. This is why Christ was revealed, who alone is undefiled and presented Himself as an offering and a sacrifice of firstfruits to the Father for our sake” (16.22, pgs 124-25). To sanctify means to make holy, thus in order to accomplish our sanctification a legal, vicarious sacrifice was required, and just so He offered Himself for us and in our place. In this way, and without diminishing the other aspects of the Atonement, “Christ overturned the devil through suffering and His flesh which He offered as a sacrifice to God the Father, as a pure and altogether holy victim - how great His gift! - and reconciled God to our human race” (16. 24, pg 125). This is a penal (which is to say legal, the legal consequence or punishment for sin) substitutionary (which means standing in the place which meets what the law demands, which is our punishment, i.e. twofold death) atonement that reconciled God the Father to man, which is thus not only an expiation or cleansing of sin but a propitiation of the wrath, which is to say the just abandonment of man, by God, reconciling or turning Him back to man in all justice. Christ, it cannot be forgotten, underwent this “passion according to the Father’s will” (16.24, pg 125). St. Gregory Palamas certainly does not leave vicarious satisfaction out of the Atonement!


The foregoing is what “procured life that was truly immortal, life that will not be subject to the second and eternal death, to the coming damnation, which is worse than ten thousand deaths” (16.24, pg 125). As St. Gregory says: “Had He not been human, it would not have been possible for Him to suffer; and had He not been God, and remained impassible in His divinity, He could not have suffered death in the flesh for our sake, thereby bestowing upon us resurrection, or rather, rising from the dead and immortality” (16.30, pg 128). Therefore and “for this reason the Lord patiently endured for our sake a death He was not obliged to undergo, to redeem us, who were obliged to suffer death, from servitude to the devil and death, by which I mean death both of the soul and of the body, temporary and eternal” (16.31, pg 128). And so, in a vicarious sacrifice that fulfills the just punishment of sin, the obligation of death, Christ addressed the twofold death of man, that of soul and body: “Since He gave His blood, which was sinless and therefore guiltless, as a ransom for us who were liable to punishment because of our sins, He redeemed us from our guilt” (16.31, pgs 128-29). Guilt therefore served as an obstacle to man's salvation, a guilt which required a holy victim in place of guilty and unholy man.

Christ’s sinlessness, it might be added, refers not only to His intrinsic holiness as a divine Person, but also necessarily points to His active obedience to the Father and to a correspondingly sinless life of obedience under the Law, doing all things with justice. Since it was God’s will that Christ God in terms of His human nature meet the demands of justice on the Cross, given that He does all things with justice, His Cross is therefore an act of God’s justice. Moreover, since God’s Law does not stand apart from His will, and Christ’s divine and human wills are in perfect accord, Christ in terms of His human nature without doubt obeyed the revealed will of God contained in the Law and so manifested this other aspect of sinlessness in His active obedience to the Law.


Although it takes us beyond the immediate consideration of St. Gregory Palamas, the Law as revealed is, in a significant sense, the Law ab extra, from outside, but it would be a mistake thereby to conclude that the Law is an arbitrary imposition. As created, man was inclined towards the good. Free will as created in man by God is therefore not a neutral space hovering somewhere between good and evil, but an objective orientation and inclination towards the good, which is to say righteousness. Man was created good, and with an original righteousness. Thus the Law is written on men’s hearts by virtue of his created nature. Therefore, when man fell and died spiritually, separated from God, this original righteousness was obscured such that, in the revealed Law man’s own original righteousness was represented back to him as external Law, as command, as a demand with consequences, which is to say blessings and curses consequent to the Law’s observance or non-observance. Thus to break the Law of God is not to break an arbitrary code of divine policy, but to move against the externally revealed law of one’s own created nature. There is in this way a metaphysical component to being in a position of trespass. Moreover, in obeying the Law one does not heal the woundedness of fallen human nature, but simply comports with what man’s own nature demands. It is impossible to perfectly or exhaustively obey this law due to the fallenness of human nature, and yet it is still required that it be obeyed simply because it is intrinsically for man to do so, to conform to the Law of His own created nature. Thus man is objectively in sin as regards his breaking of the revealed Law, and also in sin as regards his nature being fallen and at odds with the same Law as written on his heart. This is how death meets all men, even in those cases where the breaking of the external Law is not imputed. Christ, then, being perfect man, held this Law in perfect righteousness, and as such His holiness was both internal and external, for He also obeyed the Law as revealed ab extra.


Speaking about Christ’s sinlessness would be redundant if it had no specific, functional meaning. Obviously the Son of God is sinless, so why insist on it? For one, it refers to His active obedience of the Law. Christ was motivated to “fullfill all righteousness,” to fullfill the Law, every jot and tittle, and to resist all points of temptation (although Jesus was not internally tempted ab intra, in Himself, in His Person, but externally tempted ab extra by the Devil). Thus His sinlessness has a positive aspect which is also bound up in man’s salvation and union with Christ. Thus in man’s union with Christ His perfect obedience is made theirs. According to the exchange, Christ made what was ours His and what was His ours, and so what He is and has by nature He makes ours by grace. Thus we are made to participate in His divine nature, but no less are we made to participate in His sinless human nature as the New Man through our co-crucifixion, co-resurrection, and co-ascension (16.17, pg 122; 16.35, pg 130-31; cf. Homily 21, pgs 170-76). Therefore, what is true of Christ is made true of us, and so if in union with His Person His divine nature is present in us together with His human nature, for we are “in Him,” then the active, obedient sinlessness that is essential to His human nature is likewise made ours.


Moreover, Christ’s sinlessness has a sacrificial aspect. In order for Christ to be an atonement for sin, He also has to be a sacrificial Lamb without spot. Therefore, in union with Him, Christ’s sinlessness is applied to us as the ground of our justification by His blood. His sacrifice is acceptable to the Father on the grounds that He is sinless, and so this aspect of sacrificial purity is insisted upon as well in the insistence on Christ’s active or ministerial sinlessness. It is not that Christ is sinless merely because He somehow avoided sinning. Christ is holy by nature, and so His human nature, like iron in a fire, was utterly aflame with holiness, and so insisting on Christ’s sinlessness functions to affirm all of the foregoing. No mere affect of praise, it is a confession of vital truth. Thus Penal Substitutionary Atonement is deeply connected with theosis, for His holiness is not only imputed to us, it not only justifies, but also is imparted and so sanctifies man. The Spirit of Christ in us is the energy that drives theosis. Theosis is thus, in other words, not the development of personal holiness as such, but the greater manifestation of Christ’s holiness in us, the hope of glory. 


A more general objection regarding PSA may arise and which must be addressed, for someone may argue and attempt to skewer PSA on the horns of a dilemma by asserting something like this: “If the punishment for sin is loss of communion with God, which is to say separation from God, which is also to say the suffering of His just wrath, then either the Son is two persons (i.e. Nestorianism), one who suffers and one who doesn't, or the Son is not of one essence with the Father (i.e. divided Trinity).” Now, those objections do not follow, and for the simple reason that the two horns are attached to a false dilemma. As such, to the first horn of the false dilemma, the Son is necessarily one divine Person with two natures, and He suffers according to His human nature, lest someone deny that Christ could suffer at all (i.e. Docetism or monophysitism). It is axiomatic that Christ had a human nature that could suffer, and so the question is not whether He could suffer, but what He could suffer. If Christ could not suffer what is fitted to human nature, save sin, then the critique is actually emerging from some kind of Docetism or Monophysitism, as if Christ did not really incarnate and have a full human nature and so could not really be said to suffer. As another Gregory, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, writes, although in regards to Apollinarianism: 


“If the whole of his [Adam’s] nature fell, it must be united to the whole nature of Him that was begotten, and so be saved as a whole. Let them not, then, begrudge us our complete salvation” (Epistle 101). 


In other words, if Christ could not suffer what is fitted to human nature, then He was not fully man, thus denying orthodox Christology and consequently unravelling the Atonement. This horn therefore presupposes a heretical position in order to make its objection, and can be readily dismissed. Although Christ in Himself was not fallen, nothing prohibits Christ from suffering what is fitted to the whole of man’s fallen nature, his double death, for in fact He came precisely in order to do this, as in the Patristic dictum from the same Epistle of St. Gregory of Nazianzus contra Apollinarianism, “For that which He has not assumed He has not healed.” As St. Gregory Palamas stated: “He healed our twofold death and freed us from our double captivity of soul and body” (16.24, pg 126).


To the second horn, the separation from God is not metaphysical or moral, for it happens within the context of full and total agreement between Unbegotten Father and Eternally Begotten Son, therefore guaranteeing and necessitating their continued, eternal, consubstantial unity. The term “separation” in this false dilemma is being exaggerated to mean something it does not. Separation does not mean metaphysical cleavage, but extreme agony of soul: “My soul is exceedingly sorrowful, even to death” (Matthew 26:38). This statement of Christ has untouched depths, for it is the beginning of the bearing of the Cross. Metaphysical cleavage from the Father is therefore a logical impossibility, not only for the Son who is by nature consubstantial with Him and eternally existent, but for any and all created beings because it is only by His maintaining a created entity's existence that it can even be said to have existence at all. If the term separation were taken as meaning metaphysical cleavage during any entity’s separation from God, then it would entail annihilationism, which is prima facie denied. Man’s punishment for sin is already separation from God, and yet he exists. Therefore for Christ to bear this punishment of  separation cannot mean a metaphysical separation, but extreme agony of soul. The critique can therefore be dismissed since it fails to be able to account for how any man could be metaphysically separated from God and yet remain in existence. If even in fallen man the separation entailed by sin is not metaphysical but relational, as in a relation of alienation, then no cleavage is entailed and therefore there are no grounds for the objection.


Returning to St. Gregory Palamas, hopefully now we can answer the question raised at the beginning: How is human nature justified? As was shown, St. Gregory Palamas has at least two aspects, one of which is the metaphysical appropriation of man’s nature which includes also His active ministry, the other is His sacrifice for sin. These aspects form an essential unity in the Person and work of Christ that, yet, are rightly distinguished. Man’s justification is begun metaphysically with the Incarnation, and yet He is thus not justified apart from Christ’s vicarious sacrifice, and as such it is the death and resurrection of Christ as our penal substitute that justifies and redeems from guilt. St. Gregory, moreover, consistently accounted for and affirmed God’s wrath being appeased, God’s wrath being the just abandonment of the sinner. Christ bore this punishment in man’s place as a vicarious sacrifice, both expiating sin and propitiating the Father, and yet this penal substitution entails no metaphysical cleavage of the Trinity or multiplication of the natures of Christ into two Persons. Nestorianism is thus denied, despite what the Monophysite and Neo-Marcionite positions may seek to assert. 


To conclude, it is worth noting that the Homily studied above is incredibly profound and deserving of more study, for it contains yet more riches of insight and wisdom into the Atoning work of Christ. Especially fascinating is the incredibly diverse array of Biblical images and concepts which are woven into a tapestry of glorification of God and exhortation to man that, regrettably, the present study had to pass by. Multiple aspects of the Atonement can be discerned here and are worth exploring at greater length, such as ransom, binding the strong man, regeneration, adoption, despoiling hell, the double nature of death and of resurrection, the twofold nature of resurrection, and so on. That being said, there is still the more systematic reading of St. Gregory’s other works where they touch on the Atonement which would serve to extend and complete what is so far but an indicative study. What has been argued above, however, is firmly established in favor of PSA, and yet more can be brought to bear to magnify the exposition of St. Gregory’s Spirit-filled utterances on this subject.


-Fr. Joshua Schooping

Against a Sophistry of Canons: Why the Anathema Against Universalism is Absolute

Following upon the previous article's discussion of the canonical grounding for universalism's condemnation, in order to still preserve universalism one may object and attempt a sophistry, asserting that the Church condemned Origen and Origenism as a unit, and that each item that is anathematized is, essentially, like a link in a chain such that if one link is removed, it is possible to replace that separated link into a new chain that is not anathematized. In other words, each item is not condemned in itself, but only in its relation to the other condemned items. This is to say that universalism is only false if you also hold with it that, say, the sun, moon, and stars are reasonable beings (an idea condemned in the Third Anathema); otherwise, universalism is possible. The methodology, then, entails that if you can take one anathema out from a unit of ten, then that one is now rendered hypothetically permissible as long as it is placed in some other uncondemned unit. But, the logic is no different than when one would take nine anathemas out of ten and then re-hypothesize them elsewhere, for as long as the unit of ten, the condemned chain, is broken, then those nine separated links are now hypothetically permissible for use by other chains in other units. But that would make the tenth permissible! In other words, every anathematized item of the unit is actually still unanathematized as long as they are each regrounded in some other uncondemned unit. They are only anathema if they are held together with the others as a whole. So, if nine out of the ten were made to form an entirely new unit, with a new tenth link, then this new unit would be able to distinguish itself from when it was among the ten. 

Now, even if one were to seek to wiggle out of such an absurdity, the attempt is yet to say that the condemnation of universalism is so bound up with the other anathematized items that, since universalism itself doesn’t necessarily depend on those other items, then universalism can safely be removed from consideration as a heresy as long as those other items are not held together with it as a unit. This is still false, however, for the simple reason that it specifically addressed each item in order to show that each item was false, and not only as a whole unit. But how can we be sure of this? One answer is the impossibility of the contrary. For otherwise one would be able to assert that one might keep any condemned idea as long as they can reground it somewhere else. One could, as a consequence of this way of reasoning about the canons, hold to every uniquely anathematized item from every council, as long as they did not hold them together in their units, but separated them out neatly into other, uncondemned units. This method reduces the Church Fathers to imbecility, is an affront to the integrity of the Councils, and stains the holiness of the Church.

To make this clearer, according to the objection’s sophistry one could hold to the idea that the sun, moon, and stars are reasonable beings (Third Anathema, mentioned above) as long as they maintain the anathema against their reasonableness and the other anathemas proper to their unit, and place the doctrine of their reasonableness on other grounds. But how can it be false in one place and true in another? One would have to assert that the sun, moon, and stars are both reasonable and unreasonable. Obviously that approach to the anathemas is ludicrous, destroying the integrity of the canonical tradition. Each idea was condemned uniquely, on purpose, in order to show that each unique idea is uniquely condemned. They cannot be removed and then rehabilitated in other systems, otherwise the individual anathemas are no anathemas at all; they are essentially transformed into menus of ingredients for the use of other units. One could even hypothetically hold that any and all anathemas are able to be rehabilitated on other grounds such that everything that is anathematized in one place is also not anathematized in another.
The problem, as has been shown, is that according to this logic all anathemas are potentially valid as long as a person can dislodge them from their respective unit and then reassert them on some other grounds. If there are ten anathemas, then at least nine of them, and maybe all ten, can conceivably be reintroduced in other systems and so escape the anathema. Therefore, when the idea of a temporary hell is specifically condemned, it is not really that a temporary hell is being condemned, it is only that a temporary hell is condemned if one asserts that together with the idea that the sun, moon, and stars are rational beings. This sort of sophistry is thus exposed as false and dangerous, and the objection against eternal condemnation that is based on it can and ought to be rejected and dismissed outright.

Thankfully, the methodology which seeks to bind the anathematized items found on numbered lists, binding them together in such a way that if a numbered item is removed from its list then it is usable elsewhere, is addressed explicitly in the Sentence of the Fifth Council, specifically in the 14th of fourteen Capitula. Although not absolute proof in itself, it provides clear evidence of how the Council Fathers generally conceive of enumerated condemnations. Condemning Nestorianism, it declares: 

If anyone therefore shall defend the aforementioned epistle and shall not anathematize it and those who defend it and say that it is right or that a part of it is right, or if anyone shall defend those who have written or shall write in its favour, or in defense of the impieties which are contained in it, as well as those who shall presume to defend it or the impieties which it contains in the name of the Holy Fathers or of the Holy Synod of Chalcedon, and shall remain in these offenses unto the end: let him be anathema.

The condemnation clearly includes defending even only a part, which in the Origenism case is to say a specific numbered item, among the anathemas, is anathema. In other words, they cannot be treated as such a unit that if a piece can be removed then it is possible elsewhere. Although this is not stated within the specific condemnations against Origen, it clearly demonstrates the mind of the Council, a principle that the methodology of “unitism” is false. But, the concluding remark in the anathemas against Origen speaks in a similar tone:

Anathema to Origen and to that Adamantius, who set forth together with his nefarious and execrable and wicked doctrine and to whomsoever there is who thinks thus, or defends these opinions, or in any way hereafter at any time shall presume to protect them.

It is “these opinions” which identify Origen(ism), and it is “these opinions” which are each anathematized. Referring to these items in the plural highlights their stand-alone diversity, not their unbreakable unity. Defending, or “in any way” even protecting, “these opinions” is anathema. To make this conclusively obvious, after the first anathema the very phrasing of each one begins and ends, “If anyone says or thinks… let him be anathema.” And so each one stands alone as a uniquely condemned item, for each has its own “if, then” logical structure, and so “these opinions” cannot in any way be treated as a chain of dependent reasoning built of excisable doctrines. And so, not only is the general methodology of reducing such lists to a unit false, and its intrinsic absurdity exposed, but within the specific list against Origen the very structure of each anathematized item necessitates that each item is uniquely condemned and forbidden as a public and as a private opinion or theologoumenon. Therefore, universalism (and annihilationism, since the punishment never ends) is absolutely condemned.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping

Sunday, January 19, 2020

Eastern Orthodoxy Contra Universalism (Apocatastasis): The Canonical Grounding

There is an unfortunate and deeply misled tendency prevalent that “dares hope” that all people will be saved. Although on the surface this appears compassionate, and seeks to magnify God's mercy, the belief is deeply destructive of His holiness and justice. It plays His mercy against His justice, thereby dividing God's attributes off from one another, and so undermines God's unity. Moreover, it undermines the value of Christ’s Atonement, and makes it functionally irrelevant. Rather than enter into the weeds of the theological aspect of this debate, as important as it is, it is important to pause, back up, and inquire into where the Church canonically stands on the issue. And so what follows is a brief exposition of the Church’s canons regarding what is called universalism (ἀποκατάστασις, apocatastasis), the idea that one day all entities will be saved or restored to communion with God.

Several of the anathemas that were accepted by the Second Council of Constantinople, which is the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553), were composed by the Emperor Justinian, who is also a saint and respected theologian in the Church. Among the nine anathemas he pronounced against Origen and Origenism, the ninth reads: 

If anyone says or thinks that the punishment of demons and of impious men is only temporary, and will one day have an end, and that a restoration (ἀποκατάστασις, apocatastasis) will take place of demons and of impious men, let him be anathema.

This anathema expressly and unambiguously condemns the idea, both the public teaching and even the thought (i.e. theologoumenon, which is to say private opinion), that the divinely pronounced punishment to which the devils and impious men are subjected will cease. It is held to be a position that is definitely contrary to right, orthodox faith. After the resurrection and the final judgment, both demons and impious men will be cast into eternal, non-temporary punishment, according to the decision of the Fifth Ecumenical Council. In fact, the 11th Canon of this Council also lists Origen among many principle heretics:

If anyone does not anathematize Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Apollinaris, Nestorius, Eutyches and Origen, as well as their impious writings, as also all other heretics already condemned and anathematized by the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, and by the aforesaid four Holy Synods and [if anyone does not equally anathematize] all those who have held and hold or who in their impiety persist in holding to the end the same opinion as those heretics just mentioned: let him be anathema.

Sadly, the foregoing anathema would include some modern Orthodox writers. 

But some may complain that St. Justin had no business making these claims, perhaps that he even bullied the council Fathers. Nonetheless, it is there. But perhaps the Fathers were willing or coerced to capitulate to political pressures. Nonetheless, it is there. The Council ratified it. And so, whether one likes it being there or not, it is, nevertheless, there. And yet, that is not the end of the story.
From the Acts of the 6th Ecumenical Council, it is found (in the Acts, Session XVIII., L. and C., Concilia, Tom. VI., col. 1019.):

The holy, great, and Ecumenical Synod which has been assembled by the grace of God, and the religious decree of the most religious and faithful and mighty Sovereign Constantine, in this God-protected and royal city of Constantinople, New Rome, in the Hall of the imperial Palace, called Trullus, has decreed as follows.
… and in addition to these, to the last, that is the Fifth holy Synod assembled in this place, against Theodore of Mopsuestia, Origen, Didymus, and Evagrius, and the writings of Theodoret against the Twelve Chapters of the celebrated Cyril, and the Epistle which was said to be written by Ibas to Maris the Persian), renewing in all things the ancient decrees of religion, and chasing away the impious doctrines of irreligion.


Therefore the Sixth Ecumenical Council confirmed the prior Council’s anathemas of Origen’s teachings.

The Council of Trullo, the Quinisext Council, also affirms the condemnation of Origen's teachings as presented at the Fifth Ecumenical Council:


Also we recognize as inspired by the Spirit the pious voices of the one hundred and sixty-five God-bearing fathers who assembled in this imperial city in the time of our Emperor Justinian of blessed memory, and we teach them to those who come after us; for these synodically anathematized and execrated Theodore of Mopsuestia (the teacher of Nestorius), and Origen, and Didymus, and Evagrius, all of whom reintroduced feigned Greek myths, and brought back again the circlings of certain bodies and souls, and deranged turnings [or transmigrations] to the wanderings or dreamings of their minds, and impiously insulting the resurrection of the dead.

Condemning Origen explicitly, the reference to "impiously insulting the resurrection of the dead" is doubtless a reference to the Dread Judgement Seat of Christ. Speaking on this issue of what is meant by the Resurrection of the Dead mentioned at the end of the foregoing quotation from Trullo, St. John of Damascus (676-749), a contemporary of the Trullan Council (692), teaches at the very end of his Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith:


We shall therefore rise again, our souls being once more united with our bodies, now made incorruptible and having put off corruption, and we shall stand beside the awful judgment-seat of Christ: and the devil and his demons and the man that is his, that is the Antichrist and the impious and the sinful, will be given over to everlasting fire... But those who have done good will shine forth as the sun with the angels into life eternal, with our Lord Jesus Christ, ever seeing Him and being in His sight and deriving unceasing joy from Him, praising Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit throughout the limitless ages of ages. Amen. (Book 4, Ch. 27, Concerning the Resurrection)

The teaching clearly differentiates the mutually exclusive modes of eternity: one an everlasting fire of torment of "such fire as God would know," and one that is life eternal and unceasing joy in the presence of the All-Holy Trinity. The fates are presented as fixed and immutable, which accords perfectly with what is affirmed in the Ecumenical Councils.

Cementing the point, and reflecting the Orthodox position, St. John of Damascus says earlier in his chapter on the Aeon or Age:


But we speak also of ages of ages, inasmuch as the seven ages of the present world include many ages in the sense of lives of men, and the one age embraces all the ages, and the present and the future are spoken of as age of age. Further, everlasting life and everlasting punishment prove that the age or æon to come is unending. For time will not be counted by days and nights even after the resurrection, but there will rather be one day with no evening, wherein the Sun of Justice will shine brightly on the just, but for the sinful there will be night profound and limitless. In what way then will the period of one thousand years be counted which, according to Origen, is required for the complete restoration? (Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book 2, Ch. 1)
The Seventh Ecumenical Council (787), which was significantly informed by St. John of Damascus' theological thought, also adopts the decrees of the Fifth and the Sixth Ecumenical Councils, and those of Trullo. After stating the “pattern for those who have received the sacerdotal dignity is found in the testimonies and instructions laid down in the canonical constitutions,” the relevant portion of Canon 1 states:

Seeing these things are so, being thus well-testified unto us, we rejoice over them as he that has found great spoil, and press to our bosom with gladness the divine canons, holding fast all the precepts of the same, complete and without change, whether they have been set forth by the holy trumpets of the Spirit, the renowned Apostles, or by the Six Ecumenical Councils [therefore including the Fifth and Sixth Ecumenical Councils, and possibly inclusive of Trullo], or by Councils locally assembled for promulgating the decrees of the said Ecumenical Councils [which could also refer to Trullo], or by our holy Fathers.

Now, if there were improprieties regarding the Fifth Ecumenical Council’s anathemas, or if something had been erroneously smuggled into them at some point, this would have been a perfect opportunity to amend the problem (not to mention the Sixth Ecumenical Council, not to mention Trullo whose Canon 2 also rather affirmed the Fifth and Sixth Ecumenical Councils).

And yet, someone may further complain and say that the acceptance of the prior Councils was much too general to be certain that they included the specific anathemas, and therefore does not necessitate accepting the anathemas set forth from them. Despite the obvious tenuous nature of such a complaint, it will be worth noting that Canon 1 continues:

For all these, being illumined by the same Spirit, defined such things as were expedient. Accordingly those whom they placed under anathema, we likewise anathematize; those whom they deposed, we also depose; those whom they excommunicated, we also excommunicate; and those whom they delivered over to punishment, we subject to the same penalty.

Necessarily the anathemas against Origen are absorbed in this affirmation. The absolute rejection of a temporary punishment and universal restoration (apocatastasis) is de jure affirmed, and objections to it denied. Universalism is thus deemed inconsistent with Orthodox theology on canonical grounds. Not only rejected but condemned, to defend universalism is to be under the express anathema of the Orthodox Church’s binding canonical decrees as being at variance with the truth and therefore with right faith.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping
For the Church's canonical rejection of Pelagianism, see here.