Saturday, July 15, 2017

Faith in the Unseen: Atheism and Special Pleading


Common among many atheist arguments is the presupposition that the act of “faith” is something that, if done, is done instead of relying on evidence, perhaps even in opposition to relying on evidence. According to this view, faith is something exclusively reserved for religion, and science is proffered as an alternative to faith, relying as it does on empiricism, which is to say reliance on direct, testable observation. Of course, the very notion of relying on evidence implies that one is performing an act of faith in evidence, for faith, coming from the Greek term pistis (πίστις), means to trust in or to rely on, to have conviction of the truth of something, from peithō (πείθω), which means to be persuaded, as in by argument or demonstration, and not only as regards transcendental matters but mundane also.

A certain problem thus immediately arises for the atheist, a problem which ought to be raised, because to restrict faith to such a narrow, religious range of meaning is to stack the deck against religion in order to isolate acts of faith from acts of reason, and through the fallacy of special pleading exclude the many acts of faith that atheists commit each day. For example, an atheist will say that it is not “true” that God exists, but within that statement is presupposed some notion of truth.

Now, truth is invisible. Truth cannot be seen or heard, but must be abstracted from what is seen and heard. One may see many true things, but the things themselves are not truth. Truth is being claimed about some aspect of those things, but the truth itself is not those things. And yet, atheists typically affirm that they believe in truth.

Likewise, logic is unseen. One can see evidence for it in various types of statements, but logic itself is not empirical, and transcends the instances in which it is discerned. What is more, concepts are not empirical, one may see ink on a page, but the word written there is only mentally perceived, and certainly the concept which is expressed by the word is in itself non-empirical. And yet, atheists purport to rely on logic.

Again, love is concealed from the naked eye. One may observe many acts of love, but love itself remains hidden from view. For example, a mother may provide her child some hot chocolate on a cold winter day, and through this act one might perceive that there is love present. On another cold day, a person could order a hot chocolate from a coffee shop, and perceive in this act no love is present. Of course, the situation could be reversed and the mom be said to have no love, and the barista to be most loving. The point at hand, however, is that love is not an identity with the act of giving hot chocolate. The love itself is invisible, and the mere act of giving a drink is insufficient to determine whether or not love is there. And yet, atheists will often extol the real value of love, basing claims of accusation against religionists on a perceived lack of love.

What is more, peace is invisible. Peace is not simply the visible act of not fighting, or the visible act of sitting still. Even if one were to identify an act of peace, one must yet have an abstract criteria which transcends the act and which enables the act to be described as peaceful. One does not “see” peace, one perceives the invisible peace via empirical percepts.

Yet again, gravity itself is invisible. People see things fall all the time, but seeing something fall is not seeing gravity itself. One can test for the effects gravity may have on an object, but gravity itself is out of empirical view. In fact, many scientific realities are not directly verifiable empirically, only the effects they have on the things that are being measured.

In sum, there are many invisible, non-empirical “things” that most atheists would grant are in some sense real, especially in cases such as gravity. The question remains, how does this relate to faith, especially to “religious” faith?



St. Paul describes the nature of faith: “Now faith is the substance [ὑπόστασις, hypostasis] of things hoped for, the evidence [ἔλεγχος, elegchos] of things not seen. … By faith we understand [νοέω, noeō] that the worlds have been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made out of things which appear [φαίνω, phainō]” (Hebrews 11:1, 3).

In other words, faith is the intellectual substance or substructure of what is not immediately present to the senses. Faith is that act which perceives what is only mediately present through phenomena (φαίνω, phainō). Faith is the organ, so to speak, by which one understands (νοέω, noeō) and interacts with that which undergirds phenomena, what ties together the disparate experiences of the senses into a rational construct or hypostasis. Faith is the mind’s noetic substantiation of invisible, non-empirical realities, including such things as truth, logic, love, and gravity. For example, love produces many effects, but the effects of love cannot be a mere identity with love, otherwise a hateful barista’s giving of a hot chocolate would be indistinguishable from the act of love of the tender mother giving her child the same type of drink on a wintry day. Faith is thus the mind’s transempirical perception of such things as love, and also the means by which one performs empirical acts of love.

Moreover, St. Paul does not describe faith as: “faith is in the substance of things hoped for.” Neither does he define faith as: “faith is… in the evidence of things not seen.” Rather, faith is itself the substance and evidence or proof of things distant and invisible, i.e. that which is not known by the senses but discerned by the mind. Faith is thus something much more substantial and epistemological, for it is that by which we understand (νοέω, noeō) the invisible things or causes in which phenomena are rooted. In other words, an object’s visible falling is rooted in the invisible thing or force called gravity, and faith is the operation of the human mind by which one can perceive or understand that gravitational force which gives rise to the empirical falling.

Since gravity itself is not sensed, only its effects on various objects, faith is the epistemological process by which we connect the effects on those various objects to the source of those effects, i.e. gravity. In short, even though gravity is invisible, we have faith that there is such a thing called gravity because we understand the evidence, i.e. its effects, and perceive these effects as unified in a thing called gravity. Likewise, we have faith that our mother loves us because the various actions she performs visibly can be hypostatically unified in what is understood as love.

In this sense, faith is understood as the normal process of understanding from sensory experience that which is not itself reducible to sensory experience, and as such bears a resemblance to the cognitive process of abstraction, though in the case of faith it also includes that by which one can perform acts of or from that noetically perceived hypostasis, for example acts of love. It is also that by which we can receive these realities through their effects, as in, say, receiving acts of love as acts of love. Faith is, as such, not only that by which we understand these things, but also that by which we connect with, enact, and receive them. In other words, we can measure gravity, share love, live in peace, receive justice, know truth, give mercy, and celebrate beauty, when none of these things are in themselves strictly reducible to the empirical; and the means by which we engage with these invisible realities is embedded in the epistemological process termed faith. Despite being manifest through evidence, they transcend the evidence, and so it is said that we have faith in something, say love, and then point to the visible evidences of it.

Just as a hand is what enables us to grasp a ball, faith is what enables us to noetically “grasp” love, truth, logic, peace, etc. Moreover, just as one sees by means of eyes, it is likewise by means of faith that one perceives love, truth, logic, peace, etc. On the basis of its perception, faith is what opens the possibility of giving and receiving love, having the perception and conviction of truth, using and assessing logic, seeking and pursuing peace, etc. Just as the eye enables the mind to perceive physical forms or objects, so faith enables the mind to "see" or perceive the aforementioned noetic forms or “objects.” Faith is, in this sense, the eye of the mind; it is, as it were, the life or activity of the soul.

And so, when an atheist says they don’t rely on faith, or believe in invisible realities, but only empirical data, we can point out that this is untrue. Simply believing that there is some truth is itself the evidence in their belief in the invisible reality called truth, and their reliance on (i.e. faith in) it in acts of reliance on (i.e. acts of faith in) empirical data. Of course, God is truth, and insofar as an atheist relies on truth, he relies on God. Likewise, God is love, and insofar as an atheist advocates love, he advocates God. God is also pure being, and insofar as an atheist believes things have being, he is pointing to the hypostatic reality of God. God, although He is much more, is also the principle of order, the Logos, and so as much as an atheist declares order in the universe, he declares the principle of order, which is God. The atheist is unable to work out the balance of all these attributes or unify them in the single concept called God, mostly because of an excessive reliance on the empirical and a deep misunderstanding of the God concept, and also because of bad behavior by religionists. Nonetheless, the atheist performs acts of faith in non-empirical realities, and must in order to function as a human being, for faith is among the most typical of human activities. Only through the fallacy of special pleading can he deny this.

Wednesday, July 12, 2017

A Great and Fearful Mystery: St. Symeon the New Theologian on Penal Substitutionary Atonement


Following up on the previous article’s Patristic teaching on Penal Substitutionary Atonement (PSA), a closer reading of St. Symeon the New Theologian on PSA appears warranted due to the variety of questions and comments elicited therefrom. Doubts about, and false certainties that deny, how Christ could be said to be punished for the sake of man appears to some unwarranted and unPatristic. This, however, will be shown to be false. It ought to be noted, however, that the Patristic teaching on PSA is in no way beholden to Reformed articulations of the same. It is entirely possible that Patristic PSA offers much-needed corrections to misleading Reformed emphases, but whether or not this is the case, it is key to understand the Fathers' teaching on the subject, of which St. Symeon provides perhaps the longest and clearest exposition of the Scriptural data theologically understood.

To begin, in Homily 1, “The Transgression of Adam and Our Redemption by Jesus Christ” (from The First-Created Man, tr. Seraphim Rose), St. Symeon the New Theologian identifies and defines the two types of death that occurred to Adam: one of body and one of soul, both of which were passed on to all of his progeny by way of inheritance. He states (45):

Thus, in soul Adam died immediately, as soon as he had tasted [from the fruit of that tree from which God had commanded him not to taste, threatening him that if he should only taste of it he should die]; and later, after nine hundred and thirty years, he died also in body. For, as the death of the body is the separation of it of the soul, so the death of the soul is the separation from it of the Holy Spirit… Later, for this reason, the whole human race also became such as our forefather Adam became through the fall - mortal, that is, both in soul and body. Man such as God had created him no longer existed in the World.

There are a few key things to note from the above. One is that the soul Adam persisted in a state of separation from the Holy Spirit for over 900 years. Another is that after 900 years his soul finally separated from his body. Moreover, these are the two deaths which are passed on to the whole human race, rendering us corruptible and mortal, for "human nature is sinful from its very conception" (70). Thus the Fall is a condition of persisting in separation from the Holy Spirit, and persisting, one might say, by the natural power implanted in the created soul, for some period of time, as a soul-body or psychosomatic unity. This is the universal condition of man, for as St. Symeon teaches, "We are all born sinners from our forefather Adam who sinned... subject to the curse and death from him who was subject to the curse and death" (115). As he teaches elsewhere (70):


All people also who come from the seed of Adam are participants of the ancestral sin from their very conception and birth. He has been born in this way, even though he has not yet performed any sin, is already sinful through this ancestral sin.

St. Symeon contextualizes the foregoing situation with a discussion of the scope of the divine chastisement on sinners, and the nature of its remedy (44):

The sentence of God remains forever as an eternal chastisement. And all of us men became corruptible and mortal, and there is nothing that might set aside this great and frightful sentence. … For this reason the Almighty Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ, came so as to humble Himself in place of Adam. And truly He humbled Himself, even to the death of the Cross. The word of the Cross, as the Scripture says, is this: “Cursed is everyone that hangeth upon a tree” (Deuteronomy 21:23; Galatians 3:13).

What St. Symeon is making clear is that Adam had an unbreakable sentence declared against him and so upon all mankind, a chastisement, a punishment that was eternal in nature, for "the words and decrees of God become a law of nature" (82). What is more, St. Symeon clearly expressed that Christ came to stand in Adam’s place, humbling Himself “in place of Adam,” receiving the curse that was Adam’s, the death of soul and body, "for the abolition of the above-mentioned decree" (83). Since the decree is eternal and unbreakable, "a law of nature eternal and unchanging" (83), Christ came that He might submit Himself to the chastisement, to death, and then to rise again so as to break the unbreakable sentence, to destroy death by death: "Therefore, for the abolition of this decree, the Son God, our Lord Jesus Christ, was crucified and died, offering Himself as... a sacrifice frightful and infinitely great" (83).

St. Symeon asks (45-6):

Why did Christ become such a one? In order to keep the law of God and His commandments… But this was allowed so that there might be performed a certain great and fearful mystery, namely, so that Christ, the Sinless One, should suffer, and through this Adam, who had sinned, might receive forgiveness.

For Christ to keep the commandments also signifies the accepting of Adam’s chastisement, the sentence which was an eternal decree, for only He could dispense the death which was binding for all and yet not be bound by it unto eternity. In short, Christ received punishment in place of Adam, voluntarily undergoing "a death which served as punishment for the worst kind of sinners" (70). Thus, as St. Symeon states, Adam was forgiven through, and on the basis of, Christ's suffering.
It must be kept in mind that Christ did not defeat death by not dying, but by dying. He did not avoid death when He entered into pitch battle with the devil. He accepted the chastisement of Adam, entered into Adam's condition, which is to say his death, and so He fulfilled the commandment, the eternal chastisement and law of nature that bound mankind to death. He received Adam’s punishment, which was death, death meaning the separation of the soul from the Holy Spirit, from God. It is through Christ’s suffering of Adam’s chastisement that Adam is forgiven.

Since Adam had fallen under the curse, and through him all people also who proceed from him, therefore the sentence of God concerning this could in no way be annihilated; and therefore Christ was for us a curse, through being hung upon the tree of the Cross, so as to offer Himself as a sacrifice to His Father, as has been said, and to annihilate the sentence of God by the superabundant worth of the sacrifice.

Christ received the punishment which was due to Adam by God’s will. God willed as an eternal sentence of chastisement that Adam be punished, as St. Symeon explains, and so Christ received the Father’s eternal chastisement upon Himself, the decree of being separated from the Holy Spirit, which is to say death, for only through the Son’s divine nature could the eternality of the decree be defeated. The Cross, according to God’s will and thus His law, was the medium of imputing the curse of separation to the sinless Christ. It is said to be "imputed" in order conceptually preserve the fact of Christ's inherent and necessary sinlessness. To assert otherwise would be to say Christ actually became a sinner and died because of His own sinfulness rather than vicariously accepting Adam's. St. Symeon teaches: "He was hung upon a cross and became a curse... in order to loose the whole curse of Adam" (116). To "become a curse" is to say that He received the ascription of being cursed in order to loose the curse, received the condemnation in order to loose the condemnation, which was death, i.e. soul-separation from the Holy Spirit.

And yet, some will cavil and with a Nestorianizing eisegesis state that to claim Christ received separation from God implies a division, either in the Trinity or within Christ Himself. The rest of the article will argue how this is not at all the case.

To begin, it must be emphasized that Hades, the place of the death, which is to say separation, the place of those whose souls have been separated from both their bodies and from the Holy Spirit, is not without God. God is present, as the Prophet and King David sings (Psalm 139:7-12):

Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend to heaven, thou art there! If I make my bed in Sheol, thou art there! If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there thy hand shall lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. If I say, “Let only darkness cover me, and the light about me be night,”even the darkness is not dark to thee, the night is bright as the day; for darkness is as light with thee.

In other words, God is present everywhere, including Sheol, or Hades. Thus it is that in Hades God’s presence is experienced as separation. Since God is “everywhere present and fillest all things,” as the prayer “O Heavenly King” teaches, and thus also in Hades, the idea that God is absent or separated from (or out of communion with) those in Hades, and that they require His intervention (as in the descent of Christ to Hades) to effect at-one-ment or comm-union, we understand that this separation is not annihilation. It is separation, as in dislocation, as when a joint is separated or dislocated. Hades is the state of dislocation; Hades is the “place of dislocation,” the place or state of separation, and so this is not to say that the limb has been removed from the body, for in terms of the analogy Hades cannot mean that God is absent to the extent that the souls cease to exist. The souls still exist, and therefore God must be present to the degree that they are maintained in existence, but they are “separated” in a manner like a separated or dislocated joint. The limb is still present, but due to separation it is totally weakened and futile (cf. Romans 1:21; Ephesians 2:1, 5), and its dislocated mode of existence is naught but a source of pain, weakness, and futility. It is unable to restore itself to being re-jointed or “at-one-ed.” Returning from the analogy of the separated joint to the separated soul, the pain and futility therefore come from the dislocation and separation that is death, the state of separation or dislocation from at-one-ment with the Holy Spirit, though not in an absolute annihilating sense.

In the case of separation from the Holy Spirit, Adam did not immediately die in body, but persisted in his natural, psychosomatic life. Now, because his soul was separated from the Holy Spirit, Hades is the consequent “location of dislocation.” Although God is present in Hades, Hades is yet not a place of communion with God. Separation from the Holy Spirit is therefore an existential condition, not an annihilated condition. Separation or alienation is a mode of being rather than of non-being, something a person can experience or undergo and thus it does not indicate a radical departure from existence, but existence according to a certain mode. Just as hunger is a mode of relation between stomach and food, that of absence, so is death a mode relation between soul and Spirit, again that of absence. Now, if Christ was positively declared to have experienced hunger, weakness, and grief, all of which are relations of absence, it is no difficulty to understand death in the same sense, as relational absence, which is to say presence experienced as absence, as in hunger in the presence of food, loneliness in the presence of people, or a joint dislocation, rather than as pure non-existence or denial of presence.

Thus when it is said that Christ bore the chastisement or punishment for sin, and went via the Cross to the “location of dislocation,” it is absolutely not signifying a division within either the Trinity or within Christ, and could not be. To be separated does not mean God is absent in an absolute sense, but relatively and in a relational sense, and so Christ is not said to be divided off, but to experience dislocation, weakness, futility, forsakenness, i.e. death. It is a relational separation, not absolute, and so it in principle denies any ascription of division to the Godhead or between the natures of Christ, but presupposes their unbreakable unity. Hades functionally signifies “the place of separation,” and, since Orthodoxy affirms that Christ entered Hades, this does not introduce a division in the Trinity any more than stating that Christ died, for death is separation. Christ is never divided in His Personhood, nor divided from the Trinity, and so in His single Subjectivity He experienced through the medium of His created soul what separation from God is, which is just another way of saying He bore the curse of the Cross and so went to Hades.

If the created body and created soul of Christ can experience death at all, then He can experience alienation, or separation, because death is alienation/separation, as St. Symeon the New Theologian defines: "the death of the soul is the separation from it of the Holy Spirit." It would be trivial if Christ had underwent merely the condition of the death of the body, for this would not have dealt with the principle condition of fallen Adam, which is separation from the Holy Spirit. Hades is the place of separation, not merely of dead bodies, but of souls, and so for Christ to go to Hades is imply that His created soul experienced separation. It is a mystery. The soul in the state of death is what Hades is, that place of alienation from Life. Now, when we affirm that Christ died, do we mean only death of the physical body? Does He trample down physical death only? Physical death according to St. Symeon is the separation of the soul from the body, but if Christ did not heal the deeper separation, then what type of death did He defeat? We affirm that He trampled down death by death, that He went to Hades even, and so it would be contradictory to assert that His created soul did not experience alienation/separation.

To deny that Christ bore our punishment means the same thing as denying that He died, for death/separation is the punishment, death is what "punishment" means in this context. There is not some "other," super-added punishment being considered, for alienation from the Holy Spirit is the painful condition called death, Hades being the "place" of this condition, the location of dislocation. Christ didn't go to the lake of fire of the second judgment, as when He comes again to judge the living and the dead, rather He went to Hades, the location of presence experienced as relational absence, not annihilational vacuity.

The punishment of separation is a mode of relation, and therefore it asserts no radical division of Christ from either Himself or the Trinity, rather denies it, for it presupposes that Christ must be in constant relation to the Trinity at all points in order to experience separation/alienation/dislocation. To experience the forsakenness of God is, then, to experience His presence as agony, as separation and alienation, not annihilation. Otherwise, forsakenness would mean the cessation of existence. To say, then, that Christ was punished by the Father is simply to state that Christ received and bore the separated condition of Adam, what St. Symeon calls the "penance of death" (98). It does not mean there was some lightning-bolt-bearing, angry, supernatural being with a blood lust. Rather, "through the fulfillment of all justice" (96) Christ received the alienated mode of relation in order to restore communion between man and God, and this is transposed into legal terms as receiving the punishment or the chastisement.

Now, what does it mean that Christ offered the sacrifice to the Father, as St. Symeon the New Theologian teaches? It means that it was the Father’s will that Christ be chastised. Now, many balk at this, but it is perhaps the most obvious teaching from the Garden of Gethsemane, when Christ prays, “Not my will, but Thy will be done” (Matthew 26:42; Mark 14:36; Luke 22:42; John 12:27). Especially is this clear in John, when Christ asks Peter: “shall I not drink the cup which the Father has given me?” (John 18:11) In other words, it is the Father’s will that Jesus receive the curse of the Cross; He gave it to Christ. This is why St. Symeon stresses that it is God's eternal decree that must be dealt with, and why Christ came to fulfill the commandments. He did not come to sidestep the Father's judgment, but to fulfill its demands for the sake of Adam's salvation. The Father gives the Cross to Christ, it is His will that it be done, which imputes to Christ the entire curse of the law, the consequence that belongs to Adam, so that Christ can offer the sacrifice back to the Father.

The Father wills that man be saved, and the Trinity, having a single will, in the dread mystery of the divine dispensation, ordained that Christ God fulfill His Father's eternal will to restore, in the context of the created soul of Christ, the broken communion which He took upon Himself via the Cross in order to heal the rupture with the Holy Spirit, which is poured out in the heart of man (Romans 5:5). Since God willed to restore man, to heal Him through relation, Christ God entered into this condition of alienation, and so it is entirely appropriate to state that God willed that Christ bear the punishment. Misunderstandings and distortions of this doctrine which seek to portray it as portraying a despotic, arbitrary, emotional Deity in no way addresses the doctrine itself. In short, a doctrine is not evaluated according to the permutations produced by its being misunderstood.

St. Symeon teaches: “All our sinfulness is mortified by the death of Christ on the Cross” (48). In other words, Christ bears the sin and death of man by bearing man’s just punishment, having it imputed to Him via the curse of the Cross, the chastisement of separation from the Holy Spirit, which is to say, soul-death. This was willed by God upon the created soul of Christ, and yet rejects any intimation of division in the Triune Godhead, or within the two natures of Christ. Broken but not divided, the Person of the Word was able, in the context of His created soul, to undergo forsakenness, alienation, and separation, which is to say death, the chastisement of Adam, for what forsakenness means is fundamentally relational, thus preserving unbroken the Triunity of the Godhead and duality of Christ’s natures.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping
This series on Penal Substitutionary Atonement began here and here, and continues here and here.

Saturday, July 8, 2017

Thy Dread Dispensation: Patristic Teaching on Penal Substitutionary Atonement


“Come, all ye peoples, and let us venerate the blessed Wood, through which the eternal justice has been brought to pass” (Festal Menaion, “Great Vespers of The Universal Exaltation of the Precious and Life-Giving Cross” (14 September), tr. Mother Mary and Kallistos Ware, 134).

There is no shortage of assertions about the Orthodox position against Penal Substitutionary Atonement. The problem is, arguments against Penal Substitutionary Atonement (PSA) by Orthodox theologians most typically erect and too easily knock down strawman arguments, do not adequately define PSA, and resist PSA based on perceived imbalances caused by common misunderstandings of PSA. A doctrine, however, is not wrong because it is misunderstood or calumniated by its detractors, or disproven by knocking down strawmen or championing other valid views. As such, this present study proceeds in order to clarify the topic.

(I will note here, however, that due to the intensity of reactions relative to those who take various sides on this issue, I will not cite any Orthodox writers by name who have opposed PSA. My intention is not to cause controversy with men, but to clarify that which has been overlooked and unaddressed in Patristic literature. Below will be examined discussions on the Atonement primarily by St. Maximus the Confessor (7th Century), St. John of Damascus (8th Century), and St. Symeon the New Theologian (11th Century). Let the evidence speak for itself. For a more general discussion of the Atonement, please see this earlier post.)

The opening quote from the Great Vespers of The Universal Exaltation of the Cross declares that, by the Cross, the eternal justice has been brought to pass. It continues: “By the blood of God the poison of the serpent is washed away; and the curse of a just condemnation is loosed by the unjust punishment inflicted on the Just” (134). In other words, there is a just curse upon mankind which the Just one takes upon Himself, to be inflicted by this curse so that, through the shedding of His blood, which is to say by dying, He could remove the just curse from those who rightly deserved it. As the hymn continues: “For it was fitting that wood should be healed by wood, and that through the Passion of One who knew not passion should be remitted all the sufferings of him who was condemned because of wood” (134). The “sufferings of him who was condemned” is a reference to man, who had “the curse of a just condemnation” upon him, mankind “who were plunged continually in the gloom of our forefather” (151-2), which is to say “all those who, through the stealing of the fruit, had been made outcasts and were sunk in death” (134). The curse of death is the punishment man inherited, “the curse of our mother Eve that fell on all mankind” (151), which was “transmitted to all our kind like some pollution from disease” (149). Christ, then, took the punishment of man’s just condemnation upon Himself in order to remit “all the sufferings of him who was condemned.” In short, Christ took on the punishment due to man for his transgression in order to meet the eternal justice of God.

Before going on to more explicit Patristic treatment of PSA, it will helpful to treat of the logic of the basic terms involved. Firstly, the term penal is the root of the term penalty. In short, just as the wages of sin are death, so the penalty of man’s disobedience is death. The term “penal” here thus simply refers to the natural consequence, or penalty, of sin. The consequence of sin being death, one can likewise say the penalty of sin is death. The term penal is therefore a word which describes the dire situation which was “transmitted to all our kind like some pollution from disease,” the “curse of a just condemnation” that “fell on all mankind.” Curse, likewise, refers to the mark of death; to be cursed thus means to be marked for death, bound to death as a consequence of one’s action.

The term substitution means that rather than having man eternally bound to the consequence of his disobedience, which is to say death, Christ instead submitted Himself via injustice to man’s just death in order to remit man’s just death, to provide a new ontological starting-point for man unto eternal life in Him, or in St. Maximus the Confessor’s words, “another beginning (arche), a second nativity (genesis)” (Ad Thalassium 61.91). Christ substituted His life-giving death with man’s just death so that this penalty, his just death, could be undone. In the words quoted above: “the curse of a just condemnation is loosed by the unjust punishment inflicted on the Just.”

The term atonement is simply the term which signifies the work of Christ to restore man to a right relation with God, with Truth, with Life, etc. Though it could be expounded to much greater lengths, it is arguably the least controversial term in the present discussion, and so will not be discussed further here.

The logic of PSA is thus that Christ trampled down death by death in order that He might bestow life to those trapped by the penalty of sin, which is death.

It is not, however, sufficient to argue for Penal Substitutionary Atonement on the basis of a single hymn or mere logic-chopping. It is necessary also to demonstrate from the Fathers that PSA is a right interpretation of Scripture. It has been said by some that PSA did not exist prior to Anselm, but nothing could be further from the truth.

To begin, though it will only be briefly indicated here, a well-researched article was written concerning St. Athanasius’ (4th Century) view of the Atonement by Khaled Anatolios in On the Tree of the Cross: Georges Florovsky and the Patristic Doctrine of the Atonement, entitled, “Creation and Salvation in St Athanasius of Alexandria” (59-72). Though he never explicitly mentions the term “Penal Substitutionary Atonement,” all throughout he demonstrates that Athanasius’ view is consistent with it. According to him: “Athanasius argues that the death of Christ is salvific in part precisely because it is a fulfillment of divine justice” (69). Continuing:

“God’s subsequent work of salvation cannot simply abrogate this law but must fulfill it, and that is why Christ had to die in order to bring about the forgiveness of sins and our salvation. ‘It was absurd,’ says Athanasius, ‘for the law to be annulled before being fulfilled’” (69).

Since Christ works our salvation through death, according to Anatolios’ reading of Athanasius, this also “speaks of Christ’s salvific death as annulling the penalty and repaying the debt of sin on our behalf and thereby fulfilling the demands of divine justice” (63).

The next Church Father to look at is St. Maximus the Confessor, whose “Ad Thalassium 61” provides a veritable definition of Penal Substitutionary Atonement (italics added):



The Logos of God, who is fully divine by nature, became fully human, being composed just like us of an intellectual soul and a passible body, save only without sin. … in His love for humanity, He willingly appropriated the pain which is the end of human nature… He did this in order that, by suffering unjustly, He might uproot the principle of our being conceived through unrighteous pleasure, which tyrannizes our human nature. Moreover, He did it so that, with the Lord’s own death being not a penalty exacted for that principle of pleasure, like other human beings, but rather a death specifically directed against that principle, He might erase the just finality which human nature encounters in death, since His own end did not have, as the cause of its existence, the illicit pleasure on account of which He came and which He subjected to His righteous punishment. For in truth it was necessary that the Lord - who is by nature wise and just and capable - not, in His wisdom, ignore the means of curing us, nor, in His justice, arbitrarily save humanity when it had fallen under sin by its own free will, nor, in His omnipotence, falter in bringing the healing of humanity to completion. … He exhibited the equity of His justice in the magnitude of His condescension, when He willingly submitted to the condemnation imposed on our passibility and turned that very passibility into an instrument for eradicating sin and the death which is its consequence (Ad Thalassium 61.89).

An extremely profound passage, the logic of PSA is given in its fullness. St. Maximus demonstrates that the conditions of the Fall produce in man a principle of sin which works unto death, and that Christ willingly appropriated human death despite not having that principle of death within Himself. God’s justice, according to Maximus, cannot arbitrarily be set aside, for God’s justice is not an arbitrary imposition on reality, but functions as an internal condition within man unto death such that Christ, in order to heal mankind, took this death on Himself by taking on the just punishment of human sin. God does not arbitrarily forgive the consequence of sin, which is death, for, according to Maximus, because sin is a principle which produces death, merely forgiving sinful acts will not touch the principle of sin in mankind, by which it is bound up with death “by its own free will.” Forgiving sin “arbitrarily” would not solve this sin-death problem, for it is bound up with human willing, and is not merely an issue of wiping some slate clean. The very principle of sin must be dealt with, death itself must be defeated, and so Christ must substitute Himself for mankind in death in order to take on mankind’s death, i.e. the penalty of sin, in order to convert death into the very means of destroying death. If Christ did not perform a penal substitutionary atonement, then, according to Maximus salvation would be rendered impossible.

A subsequent Church Father, St. John of Damascus, like Athanasius and Maximus also far prior to Anselm (12th Century), gives an explicit treatment of PSA in two places. The first is from Book III of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 25, “Concerning the Appropriation” (italics added):

It is to be observed that there are two appropriations: one that is natural and essential, and one that is personal and relative. The natural and essential one is that by which our Lord in His love for man took on Himself our nature and all our natural attributes, becoming in nature and truth man, and making trial of that which is natural: but the personal and relative appropriation is when any one assumes the person of another relatively, for instance, out of pity or love, and in his place utters words concerning him that have no connection with himself. And it was in this way that our Lord appropriated both our curse and our desertion, and such other things as are not natural: not that He Himself was or became such, but that He took upon Himself our personality and ranked Himself as one of us. Such is the meaning in which this phrase is to be taken: Being made a curse for our sakes.

From the foregoing it is clearly argued that Christ “appropriated both our curse and our desertion,” doing so “for our sakes.” Mankind had a curse, which is death, and in order to heal us Christ appropriated it. He received the penalty in order to substitute His life for our death.

The second discussion by St. John of Damascus is from chapter 27 of the same work, “Concerning the fact that the divinity of the Word remained inseparable from the soul and the body, even at our Lord's death, and that His subsistence continued one” (italics added):

Since our Lord Jesus Christ was without sin (for He committed no sin, He Who took away the sin of the world, nor was there any deceit found in His mouth) He was not subject to death, since death came into the world through sin. He dies, therefore, because He took on Himself death on our behalf, and He makes Himself an offering to the Father for our sakes. For we had sinned against Him, and it was meet that He should receive the ransom for us, and that we should thus he delivered from the condemnation.

It will be observed that the foregoing is in reference to what has been called the “ransom” theory of the Atonement. What is key to note, however, is the phrase: “He took on Himself our death on our behalf.” He does not take on His death on our behalf, but our death on our behalf. Christ becomes man and so substitutes Himself in order to take on the death which man deserved, all in order to give man His life. Rather than getting distracted by discussions of to whom the ransom was paid, the principle by which Damascene is arguing is the PSA principle, that, for one, there is a penalty or consequence for sin, for “death came into the world through sin.” Death follows upon sin, and so to take on our death is to take on the penalty of our sin, to take on our penalty, and since Christ did this “on our behalf” it was thus substitutionary, hence penal substitution: “He received the ransom for us.” Taking on our death, i.e. paying our ransom, He thus takes our death (which is to say our penalty) upon Himself so that His death can stand in place of our death and so that our just death as a consequence can be overcome by His eternal life.

The last Church Father to be discussed here lived immediately before Anselm, and that is St. Symeon the New Theologian. From a collection of his homilies esteemed by St. Theophan the Recluse, and translated by Fr. Seraphim Rose of blessed memory, the first homily from The First Created Man is a wonderful presentation of Penal Substitutionary Atonement.

St. Symeon teaches: “When God condemns for something, He gives also a sentence, and His sentence becomes deed and an eternal chastisement, and there is no longer any possibility of annihilating this chastisement which has come from the decree of God” (43). In other words, the imposition of a chastisement is not arbitrary, but finds its root from the decreed will of God. It takes on an eternal dimension, and as Maximus observed of sin and death, becomes a principle which operates within man. In a sense, death is both the seed and the fruit of sin, and so sin must be dealt with in a way which precludes a mere arbitrary wave of the divine hand.

Those who would put a wedge between God and His decree have inserted a blasphemous arbitrariness to God’s law. God’s law is not some “other thing,” something which one could play against God Himself, that He would set aside as if He had some other act of will which could play against His first act of will. God’s law is a reflection of His simple and uncompounded nature, and His will is not some appendage or outgrowth of His Person. As St. John of Damascus states in the 9th chapter of the first book of his work On the Orthodox Faith: “The Divinity is simple and uncompounded.” Thus, to set God against His will as if He would simply erase the consequence of sin without rectifying the very principle of sin and death which is bound up with man’s very mode of being and willing would be monstrous. As St. Symeon states of man, “he became corruptible, and as corruptible, mortal” (44).

To assert that God did not to fulfill the penalty of man’s sin, which is death, would be to assert that God has not actually trampled down our death by His death, which would be to rupture the inner unity of our being caught up in Christ’s Resurrection. If it is not our death that He died on the Cross, then it is not His Life that is ours in Resurrection.

St. Symeon continues, “The sentence of God remains forever as an eternal chastisement. And all of us men became both corruptible and mortal, and there is nothing that might set aside this great and frightful sentence” (44). In other words, what we will see, is that not even Christ sought to escape this great and frightful sentence; He, too, chose to undergo the penalty of sin despite being sinless: “For this reason the Almighty Son of God, the Lord Jesus Christ, came so as to humble Himself in place of Adam” (44). This is the very logic of PSA, for Christ came in order to stand in place of Fallen Man so that Fallen Man can be raised with Christ. The Resurrection is meaningless if we are not caught up in that Resurrection of Christ, and humans cannot be raised in the Resurrection of Christ if Christ did not unite Himself to man in man’s just death, death being the penalty of sin. It is by taking on man’s penalty that Christ unites man to His mercy, and so PSA is a way of describing this mechanism, in a manner of speaking, by which Christ identifies with us in death so that we can be identified with Him in life, substituting Himself into our place so that the condemnation of death can fall upon Him rather than us and so that the Life and Resurrection that He is can be made ours.

The New Theologian continues to unfold the logic of PSA, stating there is “a certain great and fearful mystery, namely… that Christ, the Sinless One, should suffer, and through this [suffering, therefore] Adam, who had sinned, might receive forgiveness” (46). It is precisely in the vicarious suffering of death that Adam is forgiven in Christ. If Christ had not taken on the penalty of suffering death, then Adam could not have been forgiven. The logic of penal substitution is given in a beautiful series of substitutions:

“For this [forgiveness] also, in place of the tree of knowledge, there was the Cross; in place of the stepping of the feet by which our first ancestors walked to the forbidden tree, and in place of their stretching out of their hands in order to take of the fruit of the tree, there were nailed to the Cross the innocent feet and hands of Christ; in place of the tasting of the fruit, there was the tasting of gall and vinegar, and in place of the death of Adam, the death of Christ” (46).

St. Symeon asks and then answers:

“And in what does this dispensation consist? One Person of the Holy Trinity, namely the Son and Word of God, having become Incarnate, offered Himself in the flesh as a sacrifice to the Divinity of the Father, and of the Son Himself, and of the Holy Spirit, in order that the first transgression of Adam might be benevolently forgiven for the sake of this great and fearful work” (46).

Christ died, then, in order to receive the forgiveness for Adam’s sin, sacrificing Himself in Adam’s place, dying the penalty of Adam’s sin, all in order to meet the just demands and eternal decrees of the righteous God and “that by its power there might be performed another new birth and re-creation of man in Holy Baptism” (46). Implicating the Trinity in the entire economy of salvation, thus the caricatures of Christ merely appeasing an angry Father are simply unfounded critiques of PSA, for they presuppose a wedge between the Father and the Son which is a violation of first principles of Christian theology, and fail as critiques before they even begin.  

St. Symeon is unambiguous:

“Since Adam had fallen under a curse, and through him all people also who proceed from him, therefore the sentence [i.e. penalty] of God concerning this could in no way be annihilated; and therefore Christ was for us [on our behalf] a curse, through being hung upon the tree of the Cross, so as to offer Himself as a sacrifice to His Father, as has been said, and to annihilate the sentence [the penalty] of God by the superabundant worth of the sacrifice” (47).

The foregoing is for all intents and purposes a Patristic definition of Penal Substitutionary Atonement. Moreover, and in light of all that has been said thus far, let it no more be said the Church Fathers do not teach PSA. They do, and as has been shown, from the Festal Menaion to St. Athanasius to St. Maximus the Confessor to St. John of Damascus to St. Symeon the New Theologian there is a common vision of the Atonement that includes PSA, and all yet prior to Anselm of Canterbury.

St. Symeon, however, is not yet done:

“Being shamed by such a sacrifice (I speak thus), and honoring it, the Father could not leave it in the hands of death. Therefore He annihilated His sentence [penalty] and resurrected from the dead first of all and at the beginning Him Who had given Himself as a sacrifice for the redemption and as a replacement [substitute] for men who are of the same race as Himself” (47-8).

What is also clear from the foregoing is that this is not merely proof-texting, not merely a stray line here and there cobbled together. The Fathers gave substantive discussions of this issue that leave PSA unambiguous and unassailable, for as St. Symeon has been shown above to teach: “all our sinfulness is mortified by the death of Christ on the Cross” (48). Christ nails our sins to the Cross such that His death satisfies the righteous decree of God against mankind: He suffered in our place, took on the punishment due to us, took on our sentence “as a replacement for men who are of the same race as Himself.”

The logic and doctrine of Penal Substitutionary Atonement is Patristic. Moreover, it predates Western conceptions of it. Though PSA is not the only way to understand the Atonement, it certainly has a place of honor at the table, and can thus be proclaimed boldly on Scriptural, Liturgical (as was shown from the Menaion above), and Patristic grounds. Whoever would deny PSA must therefore contend with the saints treated above, and let those who would wrangle against PSA know that no amount of pointing out other ways of describing the Atonement will suffice to contradict PSA, just as no amount of proving apples disproves oranges. What is more, defeating caricatures of PSA will never address PSA itself, whether this be angry Father absurdities, or false charges of “binding God by necessity,” or dividing the Father and the Son, or any other of the typical anti-PSA tropes. PSA understood rightly, as was by the saints discussed above, is a beautiful and awesome doctrine, worthy of reverent, prayerful, disciplined consideration.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping
This series on Penal Substitutionary Atonement began here, and continues here, here, and here.