The Biblical Case for Why Masks in the Church Assembly are Unethical

Following the previous articles, here and here, which treat of fundamental issues regarding any purported relationship between Covid and the Church, another much overlooked reason why masks are inappropriate in the Church assembly is that it violates a basic principle of God’s Law.

Leviticus chapters 13 and 14 give the Lord’s instruction on how to treat those who may be sick with an infectious disease. In short, those sick or potentially sick with an infectious disease are always instructed to be quarantined. The basic principle is given thus:

And the priest shall examine the disease and shut up that which has the disease for seven days. (Leviticus 13:50; cf. Leviticus 13:4-5, 21, 26, 31, 33, 54)

Furthermore:

He shall remain unclean as long as he has the disease. He is unclean. He shall live alone. His dwelling shall be outside the camp. (Leviticus 13:46)

In other words, the medical principle is that of quarantining the sick. Moreover, the sick may require some sort of marker to identify them as sick, so that people know to be careful:

The leprous person who has the disease shall wear torn clothes and let the hair of his head hang loose, and he shall cover his upper lip and cry out, 'Unclean, unclean.' (Leviticus 13:45)

Not only are his clothes and hair to reflect his condition, notice also that he is supposed to cover his upper lip, which could be construed as a kind of masking. It shows an awareness of infectious diseases passable through the nose and mouth to others.

The fundamental distinction at play here is between clean and unclean:

And the priest shall examine him again on the seventh day, and if the diseased area has faded and the disease has not spread in the skin, then the priest shall pronounce him clean; it is only an eruption. And he shall wash his clothes and be clean. (Leviticus 13:6; re: clean, cf. Leviticus 13:13, 17, 23, 28, 34, 37, 39-41, 58-59; re: unclean, cf. Leviticus 13:3, 8, 11, 14-15, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 36, 44-46, 51, 55, 59)

Nowhere do we see those without symptoms commanded to dress or be treated as if they are sick.

We do have a case where the clean are commanded to leave the location of a possible unclean disease: 

Then he who owns the house shall come and tell the priest, "There seems to me to be some case of disease in my house." Then the priest shall command that they empty the house before the priest goes to examine the disease, lest all that is in the house be declared unclean. And afterward the priest shall go in to see the house. (Leviticus 14:35-36)

But this does not connect even remotely to the principle of marking the sick with torn clothes, loose hair, or face covering. It also shows that the clean, who were in the presence of a potentially unclean location, were not instructed to quarantine themselves or take the markers of uncleanness. Nor do we see the priest being commanded to cover his face.

What is implicit in the distinction between clean and unclean is the idea of separation. In other words, clean and unclean should not be confused. What is diseased is to be distinguished from the apparently well, and they are not to be treated alike. The markers of the clean are not to be given to the unclean, nor the markers of the unclean to the clean. It is similar to men’s and women’s clothing:

A woman shall not wear a man's garment, nor shall a man put on a woman's cloak, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your God. (Deuteronomy 22:5)

Confusion of such fundamental distinctions is an abomination, which is a principle at the heart of God’s condemnation of homosexuality:

You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination. (Leviticus 18:22)

And:

If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them. (Leviticus 20:13)

In other words, the Biblical point at hand is that to confuse what God distinguishes, or to separate what God sees as one (as the concept of race implicitly does to humanity), both alike are an abomination. Thus, to put the markers of the unclean on the clean is similarly abominable:

You shall keep my statutes. You shall not let your cattle breed with a different kind. You shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed, nor shall you wear a garment of cloth made of two kinds of material. (Leviticus 19:19)

Notice that not even the wearing of a cloth garment made of two kinds of material accords with divine law, the point again being to understand that God’s will is unto the preservation of the integrity of each class of persons, animals, and things.

Therefore, at the very least, it is unbiblical to ask people who have no symptoms of an infectious disease to dress in the clothes of those possessing infectious diseases. And to compel them to wear them is godless and unethical.

Lastly, as a final consideration, those who stray from the principle of Christian love and freedom and therein seek to compel God’s people to wear masks in the assembly, not only contrary to the spirit of God’s Law, thereby also break the law of love, for love “does not insist on its own way,” and moreover “bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things” (1 Corinthians 13:5, 7).

-Fr. Joshua Schooping

A Virus is an Act of Nature, Not an Act of Man

As obvious as it may sound, a virus is not a man. Therefore, the actions of a virus are not the actions of a man. And what can be said of a virus can be said about bacteria. Their actions are autonomous and distinct from human agency. The actions of viruses and bacteria are acts of nature (sometimes called acts of God).

In terms of liability, which means to be responsible for causation and/or effect, man is not liable for acts of nature. Only in cases of gross negligence or deliberate maleficence, i.e. an absence of reasonable care, in the instrumental use of nature can someone perhaps be considered liable for an act of nature. 

For example, if a person has a healthy tree that is struck by lightning, and the tree falls on and damages a neighbor’s property, the owner of the tree is not liable for the lightning strike or the damage caused by it. 

Now, a common objection is inserted here, which is not an objection as much as it is a diversion, that in love a neighbor may or even ought to willingly forego all questions of liability and simply choose to help. This is the important question of compassion. In this case, however, the question of liability is sidestepped, not addressed. 

To better understand, the real principle at work in the foregoing example is more clearly revealed when that same tree, say, injures ten people who were in a tent on the neighbor’s property and who are consequently sent to the ICU for three months and so produce, again say, a twenty million dollar expense. 

This example more clearly reveals the principle at work because at that point the question of love is present, but barring enormous wealth one is simply unable to afford to simply redress the problem through an act of love. Thus the question of liability comes clearer into focus, because although one may want to help that neighbor, most people are not in a position to pay out twenty million dollars. If the injured party tried to sue or otherwise compel compensation, most would agree that a private citizen ought not be held liable for such acts of nature, despite their tragic nature. If they ended up dying because of the lightning struck tree falling on the tent, should the owner of the tree then be considered guilty of manslaughter, if not murder? Would love demand that the owner of the tree willingly go to jail?

The foregoing example, it should also be pointed out, turns on a principle of ex post facto, i.e. already caused, damage. It does not turn on a preventative question as does the vaccine question. In other words, the person is not being held liable for not having priorly cut down a healthy tree. For it is perfectly legal to own a healthy tree.

Again, this is a question of actual liability. It is not a question of what we may want to do or even can do. It is purely a question of what it means to be liable for acts of nature. We may want to help or we may not want to help, we may be in a position to help or we may not be in a position to help, but what is the actual liability? 

Not forgetting the question of compassion raised above, however, and liability being especially a question of justice, I would also contend that this question of justice is also a question of compassion. Because if lightning strikes a tree and tragically harms one’s neighbors, and that neighbor attempts to sue for twenty million dollars in damages and so bankrupts the family and causes them to become homeless, then that now homeless family will wonder why they were made responsible, which is to say liable, for an act of nature, and further why no one has mercy on them. Justice, in other words, is not in principle opposed to mercy, but actually is rooted in mercy and protection against unjust retaliation, false accusations, and overreach regarding claims of liability.

Now, it seems fairly intuitive that a person cannot be made liable for an act of nature, and although the example given above is that of lightning striking a tree, the same principle applies to the acts of a virus or bacteria. For example, if someone cooks a bad batch of food and those who eat the food get sick, the cook is not then liable, if it can be shown that there was no negligence on his part and that reasonable care was maintained in its preparation and delivery. Just like the striking of lightning, acts of nature happen, and although tragic, liability is not then simply transferred to the nearest person.

In this light, a healthy person acting normally, and with reasonable care, cannot be held liable for the acts of a virus. He is right to refuse any responsibility for the acts of non-human agents. Therefore, it would be unjust for mandatory or compulsory vaccinations even in the case of contagious diseases. Those who are infected and contagious demonstrate reasonable care by quarantining themselves, but those who are healthy are not liable for acts of nature, and so cannot be subject to involuntary medical intervention, or penalized for refusal, on the basis of acts of nature that are always in principle outside the control of human agency.

In cases where one would suggest the enforcing of maximal preventative measures, the principle would thus demand that all trees be cut down, all hospitals be shut down (since they are a major location of disease transmission, and liability still applies), all restaurants and stores be closed, all windows be made of bulletproof glass, all cars dismantled, all clothing expanded to bulletproof armor, all bicycles be exchanged for tricycles, all airplanes grounded, all fast food chains shut down, all guns removed, all free speech banned, all churches closed, mandatory wearing of steel toed boots and helmets at all times, etc., with the whole world being re-envisioned in terms of these safety and liability considerations… Why? Because the expanded application of liability to all these things would be such that everyone is made responsible for every possible harmful action such that all precautions must be forcibly imposed at all times and in all locations. The absurdity of this is self-evident, as we cannot vaccinate or protect against nature itself, and there is a natural limit to which the human metabolism can even process such things, not to mention human psyches and societies.

A similar situation would be in the case of, say, a guest opening a door, entering a home, and closing the door in a normal, responsible fashion and ignorantly letting in a mosquito that had malaria. The person opening the door is not liable for the actions of the mosquito, and so cannot be held liable in the case where someone in the house contracts malaria. Nor can the owner of the house be held liable for the actions of that mosquito, even though one could maybe argue they could have any number of nets, sprays, and obstacles at the entrance of the home. A person simply cannot be held liable for the act of a mosquito, for it is an act of nature.

In conclusion, just as man does not make the wind blow violently or the lightning strike, neither does he make a disease contagious. This is simply part of the inbuilt danger of the natural, given world. If someone becomes infected, the ancient and established biblical principle of quarantining applies, but, in the case of ostensible good health, no one can be made responsible for the acts of a virus such that they should be made to submit to medical force against their person. A person is liable for their own actions and those which are in their sphere of control, not the acts of nature. An ostensibly healthy person taking reasonable care to maintain normal safety is all that is right to ask of our fellow citizens in any normal environment, but since liability cannot be extended to responsibility for the acts of autonomous entities that act independently of human volition, no one has the right to force vaccinations under any principle that presupposes such a liability.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping