Wednesday, January 22, 2020

Against a Sophistry of Canons: Why the Anathema Against Universalism is Absolute

Following upon the previous article's discussion of the canonical grounding for universalism's condemnation, in order to still preserve universalism one may object and attempt a sophistry, asserting that the Church condemned Origen and Origenism as a unit, and that each item that is anathematized is, essentially, like a link in a chain such that if one link is removed, it is possible to replace that separated link into a new chain that is not anathematized. In other words, each item is not condemned in itself, but only in its relation to the other condemned items. This is to say that universalism is only false if you also hold with it that, say, the sun, moon, and stars are reasonable beings (an idea condemned in the Third Anathema); otherwise, universalism is possible. The methodology, then, entails that if you can take one anathema out from a unit of ten, then that one is now rendered hypothetically permissible as long as it is placed in some other uncondemned unit. But, the logic is no different than when one would take nine anathemas out of ten and then re-hypothesize them elsewhere, for as long as the unit of ten, the condemned chain, is broken, then those nine separated links are now hypothetically permissible for use by other chains in other units. But that would make the tenth permissible! In other words, every anathematized item of the unit is actually still unanathematized as long as they are each regrounded in some other uncondemned unit. They are only anathema if they are held together with the others as a whole. So, if nine out of the ten were made to form an entirely new unit, with a new tenth link, then this new unit would be able to distinguish itself from when it was among the ten. 

Now, even if one were to seek to wiggle out of such an absurdity, the attempt is yet to say that the condemnation of universalism is so bound up with the other anathematized items that, since universalism itself doesn’t necessarily depend on those other items, then universalism can safely be removed from consideration as a heresy as long as those other items are not held together with it as a unit. This is still false, however, for the simple reason that it specifically addressed each item in order to show that each item was false, and not only as a whole unit. But how can we be sure of this? One answer is the impossibility of the contrary. For otherwise one would be able to assert that one might keep any condemned idea as long as they can reground it somewhere else. One could, as a consequence of this way of reasoning about the canons, hold to every uniquely anathematized item from every council, as long as they did not hold them together in their units, but separated them out neatly into other, uncondemned units. This method reduces the Church Fathers to imbecility, is an affront to the integrity of the Councils, and stains the holiness of the Church.

To make this clearer, according to the objection’s sophistry one could hold to the idea that the sun, moon, and stars are reasonable beings (Third Anathema, mentioned above) as long as they maintain the anathema against their reasonableness and the other anathemas proper to their unit, and place the doctrine of their reasonableness on other grounds. But how can it be false in one place and true in another? One would have to assert that the sun, moon, and stars are both reasonable and unreasonable. Obviously that approach to the anathemas is ludicrous, destroying the integrity of the canonical tradition. Each idea was condemned uniquely, on purpose, in order to show that each unique idea is uniquely condemned. They cannot be removed and then rehabilitated in other systems, otherwise the individual anathemas are no anathemas at all; they are essentially transformed into menus of ingredients for the use of other units. One could even hypothetically hold that any and all anathemas are able to be rehabilitated on other grounds such that everything that is anathematized in one place is also not anathematized in another.
The problem, as has been shown, is that according to this logic all anathemas are potentially valid as long as a person can dislodge them from their respective unit and then reassert them on some other grounds. If there are ten anathemas, then at least nine of them, and maybe all ten, can conceivably be reintroduced in other systems and so escape the anathema. Therefore, when the idea of a temporary hell is specifically condemned, it is not really that a temporary hell is being condemned, it is only that a temporary hell is condemned if one asserts that together with the idea that the sun, moon, and stars are rational beings. This sort of sophistry is thus exposed as false and dangerous, and the objection against eternal condemnation that is based on it can and ought to be rejected and dismissed outright.

Thankfully, the methodology which seeks to bind the anathematized items found on numbered lists, binding them together in such a way that if a numbered item is removed from its list then it is usable elsewhere, is addressed explicitly in the Sentence of the Fifth Council, specifically in the 14th of fourteen Capitula. Although not absolute proof in itself, it provides clear evidence of how the Council Fathers generally conceive of enumerated condemnations. Condemning Nestorianism, it declares: 

If anyone therefore shall defend the aforementioned epistle and shall not anathematize it and those who defend it and say that it is right or that a part of it is right, or if anyone shall defend those who have written or shall write in its favour, or in defense of the impieties which are contained in it, as well as those who shall presume to defend it or the impieties which it contains in the name of the Holy Fathers or of the Holy Synod of Chalcedon, and shall remain in these offenses unto the end: let him be anathema.

The condemnation clearly includes defending even only a part, which in the Origenism case is to say a specific numbered item, among the anathemas, is anathema. In other words, they cannot be treated as such a unit that if a piece can be removed then it is possible elsewhere. Although this is not stated within the specific condemnations against Origen, it clearly demonstrates the mind of the Council, a principle that the methodology of “unitism” is false. But, the concluding remark in the anathemas against Origen speaks in a similar tone:

Anathema to Origen and to that Adamantius, who set forth together with his nefarious and execrable and wicked doctrine and to whomsoever there is who thinks thus, or defends these opinions, or in any way hereafter at any time shall presume to protect them.

It is “these opinions” which identify Origen(ism), and it is “these opinions” which are each anathematized. Referring to these items in the plural highlights their stand-alone diversity, not their unbreakable unity. Defending, or “in any way” even protecting, “these opinions” is anathema. To make this conclusively obvious, after the first anathema the very phrasing of each one begins and ends, “If anyone says or thinks… let him be anathema.” And so each one stands alone as a uniquely condemned item, for each has its own “if, then” logical structure, and so “these opinions” cannot in any way be treated as a chain of dependent reasoning built of excisable doctrines. And so, not only is the general methodology of reducing such lists to a unit false, and its intrinsic absurdity exposed, but within the specific list against Origen the very structure of each anathematized item necessitates that each item is uniquely condemned and forbidden as a public and as a private opinion or theologoumenon. Therefore, universalism (and annihilationism, since the punishment never ends) is absolutely condemned.

-Fr. Joshua Schooping